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CONGRESS’S DOMAIN:  
APPROPRIATIONS, TIME, AND CHEVRON 
MATTHEW B. LAWRENCE† 
ABSTRACT 
  Annual appropriations and permanent appropriations play 
contradictory roles in the separation of powers. Annual appropriations 
preserve agencies’ need for congressionally provided funding and 
enforce a domain of congressional influence over agency action in 
which the House and the Senate each enforce written unicameral 
commands through the threat of reduced appropriations in the next 
annual cycle. Permanent appropriations permit agencies to fund their 
programs without ongoing congressional support, circumscribing and 
diluting Congress’s domain. 
  The unanswered question of Chevron deference for appropriations 
demonstrates the importance of the distinction between annual 
appropriations and permanent appropriations. Uncritical application 
of governing deference tests that emphasize the time and procedural 
steps an agency put into an interpretation would tend to favor deference 
for agency interpretations of permanent appropriations, but not for 
annual appropriations. Yet this result is upside-down if courts’ goal is 
to promote accountability and avoid interference with the balance of 
power between the political branches. Chevron has two core functions, 
a subdelegation function (it transfers the authority delegated in 
ambiguities from courts to agencies) and an anti-entrenchment 
function (it relieves interpretations of the solidifying force of stare 
decisis). As applied to annual appropriations, both functions respect 
Congress’s primary role in enforcement through the appropriations 
cycle; as applied to permanent appropriations, both functions interfere 
with Congress’s domain. 
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  Courts that evaluate Chevron for appropriations without 
acknowledging and addressing the elemental difference between 
annual appropriations and permanent appropriations interfere with the 
political branches and frustrate Congress’s expectations. Courts should 
adopt a bifurcated approach to Chevron for appropriations that 
disfavors deference for permanent appropriations provisions, but not 
for annual appropriations provisions. This Article suggests how the 
distinction between annual and permanent appropriations may be 
relevant to the incorporation of appropriations into other aspects of 
administrative law doctrine, including legislative standing, 
reviewability, and nondelegation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“Unless they[’re] paying your bills, pay them . . . no mind.”1 
—RuPaul 
“The Congress shall have Power . . . To raise and support Armies, but 
no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term 
than two Years.”2 
—United States Constitution 
In my house, we have our five-year-old feed the dogs. Our 
reasoning will be intuitive to any pet owner. Pets naturally respect the 
“hand that feeds,” aware that anyone who they count on for food has 
a ready means of punishing disobedience—through the stomach. But 
pets feel no such gastronomic compulsion to obey those who they do 
not count on for their daily meals. “[H]unger changes worlds.”3  
This simple metaphor is critical for understanding the 
contradictory roles of annual appropriations and permanent 
appropriations in the separation of powers context. The Constitution 
prohibits federal spending without an “appropriation”—legislation 
specifying an amount and source of funds for an agency to use for a 
designated purpose.4 Much like a pet obeys a master on whom it 
depends for daily meals, agencies dependent upon annual 
appropriations obey both houses of Congress because each must 
consent to enact such appropriations.5 Through this “hands that feed” 
 
 1. RUPAUL, Sissy That Walk, on BORN NAKED (RuCo Inc. 2014). 
 2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12. 
 3. CARL SANDBURG, 75, in THE PEOPLE, YES 196, 196 (First Harvest ed. 1990). 
 4. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-464SP, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL 
APPROPRIATIONS LAW ch. 2, at 2-23 to 2-24 (4th ed. 2016) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES OF 
APPROPRIATIONS LAW], https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/675709.pdf [https://perma.cc/5VBU-
ASJ5]; see, e.g., United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317, 321 (1976) (plurality opinion) (holding 
that funds appropriated for providing free transcripts could only be spent for that purpose when 
expressly authorized by statute).  
 5. U.S. CONST. art I, § 7, cl. 2, § 9, cl. 7. 
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dynamic, Congress has made annual appropriations a domain where 
the House of Representatives and the Senate have enduring, 
independent power and in which each house enforces compliance with 
“law”—including unicameral texts that no court would enforce even if 
it had the time to exercise review—through the threat of retribution in 
the appropriations cycle.6 On the other hand, permanent 
appropriations provisions play a destructive role in this dynamic. They 
give agencies a way to feed themselves without, or, even despite, the 
House and Senate, thus shrinking and diluting Congress’s domain.  
Annual and permanent appropriations are essentially opposites—
matter and anti-matter, fire and water—in the separation of powers.7 
One preserves what the other destroys: namely, agencies’ underlying, 
recurring need for funds that only the mutual assent of both the House 
and Senate can provide.8  
This distinction between annual appropriations, which preserve 
congressional power, and permanent appropriations, which destroy it, 
was well understood to the Framers. The Constitution explicitly 
prohibits permanent and future appropriations for the army,9 a 
provision the Framers included to secure an ongoing check on the use 
of military force for popular majorities (who get to elect a new House 
every two years), no matter what their predecessors might have 
enacted into law.10 The two-year clause keeps the use of military force 
 
 6. See infra Part II.A (describing how agencies and Congress treat appropriations 
committee reports, conference reports, and budget justifications as binding legal texts).  
 7. Annual and permanent appropriations are not precisely opposites—the “essentially” 
here glosses over subtleties to make a systemic point. From the standpoint of future congresses, 
permanent appropriations take away power over the particular programs they fund; but from the 
standpoint of the congress that enacts a permanent appropriation, doing so increases power over 
the policies that will be in place in the future. Moreover, the specific impact of annual 
appropriations depends on the program to be funded—if future congresses “like” an annually 
funded program that their President “dislikes,” then the power generated by the annual funding 
stream may well inure to the President. Cf. Joseph Fishkin & David E. Pozen, Asymmetric 
Constitutional Hardball, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 915, 961–64 (2020) (noting that Republicans’ 
preference for limited government can mean they draw more power from threat of government 
shutdown than Democrats do).  
 8. Congress can also play a role in generating agencies’ underlying needs for funds, thereby 
increasing its power. See Matthew B. Lawrence, Disappropriation, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 17–21, 
27–28 (2020) [hereinafter Lawrence, Disappropriation] (explaining that Congress can use 
legislative conduct and spending commitments to create a future need for funds to honor those 
commitments).  
 9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12. 
 10. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 24, at 158 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(describing limiting durations of appropriations for the army as an “important qualification even 
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forever within Congress’s domain. But despite the constitutional 
pedigree of the temporal distinction between annual and permanent 
appropriations, it is underappreciated in contemporary doctrine11 and 
scholarship.12 This is a symptom of administrative law’s longstanding 
failure to, in Professor Gillian Metzger’s words, “take appropriations 
seriously.”13 
This Article explains the contrasting effects of annual (and other 
near-term) and permanent (and other future) appropriations 
provisions on the separation of powers.14 It then demonstrates how this 
distinction can be determinative in incorporating appropriations into 
administrative law doctrine by addressing the unresolved question of 
how Chevron15 applies to appropriations. Blockbuster lawsuits about 
the construction of a wall along the southern border16 and the 
 
of the legislative discretion” which, “upon a nearer view of it will appear to be a great and real 
security against military establishments without evident necessity”); Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. 
Posner, Timing Rules and Legal Institutions, 121 HARV. L. REV. 543, 549 (2007) (“[T]he Military 
Appropriations Clause necessitates a repeated declaration by the legislature that the 
appropriation is necessary.”). 
 11. See infra Part III.B (describing cases applying Chevron to appropriations provisions 
without regard to their duration). 
 12. Prior scholarship has acknowledged the distinctive congressional role in the annual 
appropriations process as well as the fact that permanent appropriations provisions diminish legislative 
power, but has not developed the annual versus permanent appropriations distinction or its doctrinal 
implications. See, e.g., JAMES WALLNER, TESTIMONY: “EXAMINING ‘BACKDOOR’ SPENDING BY 
FEDERAL AGENCIES,” SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE ON 
OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS 8 (Dec. 11, 2018), https://docs.house.gov/meetings/GO/
GO04/20181211/108786/HHRG-115-GO04-Wstate-WallnerJ-20181211.pdf [https://perma.cc/B598-
G8G5] (noting that congressional influence is diminished if an “agency’s funding d[oes] not require 
congressional approval”); Alan L. Feld, The Shrunken Power of the Purse, 89 B.U. L. REV. 487, 494 
(2009) (“Permanent appropriations constrain Congress’s ability to review and change priorities 
through the appropriation process.”); Peter L. Strauss, Was There a Baby in the Bathwater? A 
Comment on the Supreme Court’s Legislative Veto Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 789, 813 (“The 
enforcement of budgetary limitations is almost wholly internal to the political branches of 
government, and a matter of intense and appropriate congressional interest.”). 
 13. See Gillian Metzger, Taking Appropriations Seriously, 121 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2021) (manuscript at 1) (on file with author). 
 14. The distinction between permanent and future appropriations provisions, on the one 
hand, and annual and other near-term appropriations, on the other, is described infra Part I.A. 
 15. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 16. Sierra Club v. Trump, 929 F.3d 670, 692 (9th Cir. 2019) (refusing to grant Chevron 
deference when determining meaning of an appropriations transfer provision, despite silence 
about deference from government). 
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Affordable Care Act’s (“ACA”) health insurance subsidies17 have 
recently brought the question of whether courts should defer to 
agencies’ interpretations of ambiguous appropriations to the fore. Yet 
the federal appellate courts have not definitively resolved it. District 
courts have taken contradictory approaches,18 and legal scholarship has 
offered little guidance.19  
The distinction between annual and permanent appropriations is 
pivotal to evaluating doctrinal paths forward for the unresolved 
question of Chevron’s applicability to appropriations law. Unmindful 
application of the Supreme Court’s governing, if indeterminate, Mead20 
test for appropriations provisions favors deference for permanent 
appropriations but not for annual appropriations. This is because 
permanent appropriations are more likely to be included in a measure 
specific to one agency and are on the books long enough for agencies 
to interpret them through notice-and-comment rulemaking. But, as 
this Article explains, this result is upside-down if courts’ goal is 
avoiding interference with the balance of power between the legislative 
and the executive branches. Chevron has two core functions: a 
subdelegation function, which transfers the authority delegated in 
ambiguities from courts to agencies; and an anti-entrenchment 
function, which relieves interpretations of the solidifying force of stare 
decisis. Applied to annual appropriations, both functions respect 
Congress’s primary role in enforcing appropriations law. Applied to 
permanent appropriations, both functions undermine Congress’s 
domain.  
Courts that evaluate Chevron for appropriations without 
acknowledging and addressing the elemental difference between 
annual and permanent appropriations interfere with the political 
branches and frustrate Congress’s likely expectations. Courts that are 
cognizant of appropriations provisions’ distinctive role within the 
separation of powers should address the confusion that surrounds 
 
 17. U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 185 F. Supp. 3d 165, 188 (D.D.C. 2016) 
(refusing government’s request for Chevron deference in determining availability of permanent 
appropriations to honor legislative commitment). 
 18. See infra Part III.B (surveying cases). 
 19. No article has squarely confronted the applicability of Chevron to appropriations 
provisions. The article that comes the closest is Mila Sohoni, On Dollars and Deference: Agencies, 
Spending, and Economic Rights, 66 DUKE L.J. 1677 (2017). However, that article addresses only 
deference to agency interpretations that create binding legal commitments, not agency 
interpretations of appropriations law. For an explanation of the distinction between legal 
commitments and appropriations, see Lawrence, Disappropriation, supra note 8, at 10–21.  
 20. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
LAWRENCE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/19/2021  5:09 PM 
2021] CONGRESS’S DOMAIN 1063 
Chevron’s applicability to appropriations by employing the bifurcated 
approach developed in this Article. This approach disfavors deference 
for permanent appropriations provisions but not annual 
appropriations provisions.  
This Article’s contribution is descriptive, doctrinal, normative, 
and prescriptive. Its descriptive contribution is to elaborate on the role 
of annual appropriations in preserving and supporting an often-
overlooked domain of legislatively enforced law governing agencies 
and on the role of permanent appropriations in curbing and diluting 
Congress’s domain. Its doctrinal contribution is to map courts’ 
confusion in deciding whether to treat agencies’ interpretations of 
ambiguous appropriations provisions as binding; that is, in deciding 
whether to apply Chevron to appropriations. Its normative 
contribution is to argue that the effects of applying Chevron to 
appropriations depend critically on whether the interpreted provision 
is annual (or near term) or permanent (or future term). Finally, its 
prescriptive contribution is to argue, in light of all of this, that courts 
and scholars incorporating appropriations into administrative law 
doctrine should begin with the elemental distinction between annual 
appropriations and permanent appropriations.  
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes appropriations 
concepts and practices that are helpful in understanding the separation 
of powers and doctrinal questions appropriations present. It describes 
the anatomy of a typical statutory appropriation and the outer 
boundaries of what constitutes an “appropriation.” It also elaborates 
on the distinction between annual (and other near-term) 
appropriations and permanent (and other future-term) appropriations. 
Part II explains how annual appropriations preserve and enforce 
a domain of unicameral “law” governing administrative agency 
behavior. This domain includes texts no court would enforce but that 
agencies and Congress treat as binding, including appropriations 
committee reports, conference reports, and budget justifications. Part 
II also explains how permanent appropriations provisions circumscribe 
and dilute this domain of enduring congressional influence.  
Part III demonstrates the doctrinal importance of the distinction 
between annual and permanent appropriations provisions through the 
example of Chevron for appropriations. It summarizes the doctrinal 
confusion surrounding Chevron’s applicability to appropriations, 
detailing the inconsistent approaches taken by the few courts to 
address this question. These approaches demonstrate that 
appropriations do not fit readily into the literal terms of governing 
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doctrinal tests. It then argues for a bifurcated approach that hinges 
deference on whether an appropriations provision is annual or 
permanent. Among other benefits, this bifurcated approach avoids 
interference with the separation of powers—it respects Congress’s 
domain.  
Finally, a brief conclusion summarizes the Article’s contribution 
and reflects on the broader implications of the elemental distinction 
between annual and permanent appropriations for administrative law 
doctrine. It suggests, based on this distinction, future inquiry into 
whether Congress can delegate the appropriations power to the 
executive branch in permanent law, the applicability of the Supreme 
Court’s holding that lump-sum appropriations are committed by law to 
agency discretion to long-term appropriations provisions, and the 
relevance of the duration of appropriations provisions to the legislative 
standing debate.  
I.  WHAT IS AN “APPROPRIATION”? 
Founding-era documents emphasize the Framers’ expectation that 
Congress’s appropriations power would play a critical role in the 
separation of powers.21 Contemporary courts and commentators have 
validated that expectation.22 Yet, while the fact that appropriations are 
 
 21. See 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 466 (1796) (statement of Rep. Gallatin) (“[T]he general power 
of granting money, also vested in Congress, would at all events be used, if necessary, as a check 
upon, and as controlling the exercise of the powers claimed by the President and Senate.”). The 
significance of the “power of the purse”—while encompassing more than simply appropriations, 
see Lawrence, Disappropriation, supra note 8, at 11–12—was couched in terms equally applicable 
to the appropriations power: 
The House of Representatives cannot only refuse, but they alone can propose the 
supplies requisite for the support of government. They, in a word, hold the purse . . . [,] 
the most complete and effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm the 
immediate representatives of the people, for obtaining a redress of every grievance, 
and for carrying into effect every just and salutary measure. 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 58, supra note 10, at 359 (James Madison); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 
30, supra note 10, at 188 (Alexander Hamilton) (“Money is, with propriety, considered as the vital 
principle of the body politic; as that which sustains its life and motion and enables it to perform 
its most essential functions.”). For an excellent overview of the importance of the power of the 
purse to the Framers, see generally JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION, LEGISLATIVE 
AUTHORITY AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS (2017). 
 22. See Off. of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 425 (1990) (“Any exercise of a power 
granted by the Constitution to one of the other branches of Government is limited by a valid 
reservation of congressional control over funds in the Treasury.”); U.S. Dep’t of the Navy v. 
FLRA, 665 F.3d 1339, 1346 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“The power over the purse was one of the most 
important authorities allocated to Congress in the Constitution’s [separation of powers] . . . .”); 
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important to the separation of powers is well-known, the actual nature 
and role of appropriations are poorly understood.  
What is an appropriation? Is the Medicare statute an 
appropriation? Is the Hyde Amendment, which prohibits the use of 
federal funds for abortion,23 an appropriation? And what do 
appropriations do for Congress when a shutdown is not threatened, or 
during periods when the president, House, and Senate are controlled 
by the same party?  
Section A details the anatomy of a legislative appropriation, 
including key terms. Section B describes the fuzzy edges—and the clear 
center—of the “appropriations law” category. Section C discusses 
appropriations procedure. 
A. Anatomy of a Statutory Appropriation 
The Appropriations Clause of the U.S. Constitution prohibits the 
expenditure of funds from the treasury except “in Consequence of 
Appropriations made by Law.”24 This means that even if a law 
commands an agency to expend funds, the agency that is subject to that 
command cannot comply—must break the law—unless Congress has 
also enacted an “appropriation” permitting the expenditure.25 
Congressional rules refer to laws that permit or require spending as 
“authorizations” and laws that appropriate the funds necessary to 
actually spend as “appropriations,” though an appropriation need not 
be preceded by an authorization to be constitutionally effective.26 
 
Zachary S. Price, Funding Restrictions and Separation of Powers, 71 VAND. L. REV. 357, 360 
(2018) (describing “Congress’s . . . authority to deny access to public funds” as “one of its most 
essential constitutional authorities”); id. at 367–68 (“Through the ingenious practice, begun with 
the very first Congress, of appropriating funds only one year at a time, Congress has ensured that 
presidents must always come back every year seeking money just to keep the government’s lights 
on.”). 
 23. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 302 (1980). 
 24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.  
 25. See United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317, 321 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he 
expenditure of public funds is proper only when authorized by Congress . . . .”); Cincinnati Soap 
Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308, 321 (1937) (“[N]o money can be paid out of the Treasury unless 
it has been appropriated by an act of Congress.”); Reeside v. Walker, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 272, 291 
(1851) (“It is a well-known constitutional provision, that no money can be taken or drawn from 
the Treasury except under an appropriation by Congress.”). See generally Lawrence, 
Disappropriation, supra note 8, at 47–61 (exploring what happens when Congress fails to 
appropriate funds necessary to honor a prior legislative commitment).  
 26. See Amanda Chuzi, Note, Defense Lawmaking, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 995, 997–1004 
(2020) (describing interplay of authorizations and appropriations). 
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Amount, source, purpose. To be an “appropriation,” there first 
must be a legislative enactment passed by both Houses and either not 
vetoed or with any veto overridden.27 The enactment must specify a 
source of funds, an amount of funds (which may be written in definite 
terms or indefinite terms), and a purpose for which the specified funds 
are to be used.28 In the early twentieth century, Congress clarified that 
the making of an appropriation must be explicit; it cannot be inferred29 
Funding restrictions. Laws often specify not only a purpose for 
which funds may be used, but also purposes for which funds may not 
be used. For example, a law could state that funds may be used “for 
vehicles in the park, but not for bicycles.” Explicit limitations on the 
purpose for which funds may be used are known as “funding 
restrictions,”30 though the law’s affirmative statement of purpose also 
naturally restricts the purposes to which funds may be put.31 The Hyde 
Amendment, which limits the use of federal funds for abortion, is 
perhaps the most famous funding restriction.32 President Barack 
Obama’s effort to close Guantanamo Bay,33 the use of cost-benefit 
analysis in regulatory review during the Reagan administration,34 and 
ending military activity in Vietnam have all been the subject of funding 
restrictions.35 Given their long historical pedigree and the fact that they 
act as direct statements of an appropriation’s purpose, it is hard to 
 
 27. PRINCIPLES OF APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 4, at 2-59. 
 28. Id. at 2-24, 2-57. 
 29. Act of June 30, 1906, ch. 3914 § 9, 34 Stat. 764 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. 
§ 1301(d)). 
 30. These restrictions are often strategically deployed as limitation riders “[w]hen no other 
legislative device is available.” Neal E. Devins, Regulation of Government Agencies Through 
Limitation Riders, 1987 DUKE L.J. 456, 464. 
 31. Cf. United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317, 321 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“Where 
Congress has addressed the subject as it has here, and authorized expenditures where a condition 
is met, the clear implication is that where the condition is not met, the expenditure is not 
authorized.”). 
 32. Devins, supra note 30, at 466 (describing the Hyde Amendment as “an ingrained part of 
the appropriations landscape”). See generally Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (addressing 
the constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment). 
 33. Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76, div. C, tit. VIII, 
§§ 8110–8111, 128 Stat. 86, 131–32.  
 34. Judith Havemann, ‘Defunding’ OMB’s Rule Reviewers, WASH. POST, July 18, 1986, at 
A17. 
 35. DAVID J. BARRON, WAGING WAR: THE CLASH BETWEEN PRESIDENTS AND 
CONGRESS, 1776 TO ISIS 343–44, 350 (2016) (discussing use of funding restrictions and denials in 
the Vietnam conflict). 
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argue that funding restrictions are not themselves part of the 
underlying “appropriation.”  
Conditional funding authorities. Analogous to funding restrictions, 
some enactments expand or alter the purpose to which a designated 
amount might be put under certain specified conditions.36 There is not 
a consistent terminology for such provisions in appropriations law. I 
refer to them here as “conditional funding authorities.” The 
conditional funding authority in 10 U.S.C. § 2808, for example, permits 
the use of certain military funds for certain construction purposes if the 
president has declared an emergency that “requires use of the armed 
forces” and the secretary of defense deems such construction to be 
“necessary to support such use.”37  
Transfer authorities. Relatedly, some enactments direct that some 
or all of the amount designated for one purpose be used for another 
purpose under certain specified conditions.38 Such “transfer 
authorities” might be thought of as negatively intertwined conditional 
funding authorities: one of these reduces the amount available for a 
purpose under certain conditions and the other increases the amount 
available for a different purpose by a corresponding amount under 
those same conditions—like a seesaw. The transfer authority in § 8005 
of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2019, for 
example, permits the transfer of certain Department of Defense 
(“DOD”) funds for use in counternarcotics operations if the secretary 
believes it necessary and if she has not already requested and been 
denied such funds from Congress.39 
Period of availability (time). Appropriations provisions—
statements of an amount, source, and purpose; funding restrictions; 
conditional funding authorities; and transfer authorities may have 
varying periods of availability or applicability. Approximately half of 
federal spending is controlled by annual appropriations provisions that 
the law provides will become available either at enactment or for the 
 
 36. Eloise Pasachoff, The President’s Budget Powers in the Trump Era, in EXECUTIVE 
POLICYMAKING: THE ROLE OF THE OMB IN THE PRESIDENCY 69, 78–79 (Meena Bose & Andrew 
Rudalevige eds., 2020) [hereinafter Pasachoff, The President’s Budget Powers]. 
 37. 10 U.S.C. § 2808 (2018). 
 38. Pasachoff, The President’s Budget Powers, supra note 36, at 78–79. 
 39. Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-245, div. A, tit. VIII, 
§ 8005, 132 Stat. 2982, 2999. 
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very next fiscal year, and expire (or lapse) within a year or two.40 The 
rest is controlled by permanent appropriations provisions, which never 
expire, or provisions that the law makes available or applicable for 
some future period well after enactment. For example, the ACA 
appropriated billions for Medicare innovation, for each of the ten years 
following the law’s enactment.41  
Definite versus indefinite. Usually appropriations set an amount of 
funding that is “definite”—that is, capped at a specific amount like 
“$1 million” or “$100 billion.” Some appropriations are “indefinite,” 
though, meaning they are uncapped and permit the expenditure of 
however much is necessary to satisfy their associated purpose.42 The 
Social Security Act’s primary appropriation is indefinite: it simply 
makes funds from the Trust Fund available to satisfy obligations 
incurred in the Social Security program.43 Similarly, the Judgment 
Fund appropriation Congress established to satisfy court judgments is 
also indefinite.44 Indefinite appropriations tend to be found in 
permanent law. 
B. When Is an Appropriation Not an Appropriation (And When Is 
Ordinary Legislation Actually an Appropriation)? 
Three further issues in defining categories require attention up 
front. First, of course, a measure that creates an appropriation, whether 
an annual appropriation or a permanent one, can include provisions 
that have nothing to do with the appropriation at issue. In budget 
speak, these are referred to as “general provisions.”45 For example, the 
Fiscal Year 2010 appropriations act included a general provision 
“requir[ing] all federal agencies to have a written policy for ensuring a 
drug-free workplace.”46 This Article does not squarely address the 
 
 40. Though approximately two-thirds of federal spending is considered “mandatory” in the 
sense that Congress has no choice but to allocate funding, a significant fraction of this 
“mandatory” spending is in fact subject to annual appropriations. See Lawrence, 
Disappropriation, supra note 8, at 22. 
 41. 42 U.S.C. § 1115A (2018). 
 42. See PRINCIPLES OF APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 4, at 2-10. 
 43. John Harrison, New Property, Entrenchment, and the Fiscal Constitution, in FISCAL 
CHALLENGES: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO BUDGET POLICY ch. 13, at 401, 404 
(Elizabeth Garrett, Elizabeth A. Graddy & Howell E. Jackson eds., 2008) (describing Social 
Security financing structure). 
 44. 31 U.S.C.A. § 1304 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-158).  
 45. See CONG. RSCH. SERV., 98-648, APPROPRIATIONS BILLS: WHAT ARE “GENERAL 
PROVISIONS”? 1 (2010). 
 46. Id. 
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interpretation of general provisions that do not describe how funds 
may be used, and it leaves the extent to which its analysis applies to 
general provisions to other articles. Although such provisions are part 
of an “appropriation measure” in a limited formal sense, in other 
formal senses they are not (namely, they are connected to an 
appropriation only by the measure that carries them), and they are not 
at all part of an “appropriation” in a functional sense. 
Second, many appropriations provisions incorporate other 
provisions of law by reference, either explicitly or implicitly. In such a 
case, interpreting the incorporated underlying provision can itself, in a 
sense, change the generosity of the appropriation or the purposes it 
may be put toward. For example, the permanent, indefinite 
appropriation for refundable tax credits is available for “refunds due 
from credit provisions” of the tax code,47 such as the now-expired 
refundable tax credit for Build America Bonds48 or the ACA’s 
premium tax credits.49 Thus, an interpretation of the underlying law 
creating those credits would affect the generosity of the appropriation. 
King v. Burwell50 illustrates this. Because the refundable tax credit 
appropriation is permanent and indefinite, the Supreme Court’s 
decision about the meaning of the ACA’s tax credit provision had 
direct consequences for the purposes for which the tax credit 
appropriation would be available and the amount expended through 
that appropriation.51  
To some extent, the separation of powers issues surrounding 
permanent appropriations discussed in Part II apply as well to 
interpretations of statutory terms incorporated by reference in 
appropriations. That said, this Article does not consider such cross-
referenced provisions to be “appropriation” provisions unless 
Congress itself gives them this label. This respects the distinction 
between “authorizing” legislation, which may permit or compel 
spending, and “appropriations,” which provide the constitutional 
permission to spend that is fundamental to appropriations law and 
 
 47. 31 U.S.C. § 1324(b)(2) (2018). 
 48. See Blaine G. Saito, Building a Better America: Tax Expenditure Reform and the Case of 
State and Local Government Bonds and Build America Bonds, 11 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 577, 
580 (2013) (describing the Build America Bonds program). 
 49. 31 U.S.C. § 1324(b)(2) (indicating I.R.C. § 36B as one such credit provision). 
 50. King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473 (2015). 
 51. See id. at 496–98. 
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practice.52 Moreover, Congress often chooses to provide for spending 
in one law while providing the necessary appropriations in another, and 
this “dissonance” itself has important implications for the separation 
of powers.53 Conflating individual spending provisions with their 
associated appropriations would collapse this distinction and vitiate 
Congress’s choice to make them distinct. The doctrinal 
recommendations described in Part III, for operational reasons and out 
of respect for Congress’s labeling choices, encompass spending 
provisions in permanent law that happen to be incorporated by 
reference in an appropriation only to a limited extent. This Article’s 
core focus is therefore on provisions that are both formally and 
functionally appropriations provisions: with amount, source, and 
affirmative purpose statements; funding restrictions; conditional 
funding authorities; and transfer authorities. 
Third, the domain of “appropriations law” includes more than 
appropriations provisions themselves. This term is also used to 
describe framework statutes that regulate agencies’ and Congress’s 
behavior regarding various fiscal issues, including spending and 
entering contracts. One such framework statute, for example, is the 
Antideficiency Act, which creates criminal penalties for spending 
without an appropriation. The Government Accountability Office 
(“GAO”), the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”), and the 
Department of Justice have a significant role in detecting 
noncompliance with these laws and enforcing them.54 This Article does 
not squarely address these framework statutes.  
C. Appropriations Procedure? 
Appropriations themselves are made by Congress through 
legislation. But agencies must implement them, obligating funds and 
 
 52. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-05-734SP, A GLOSSARY OF TERMS USED 
IN THE FEDERAL BUDGET PROCESS 13, 15, 21 (2005), https://www.gao.gov/assets/80/76911.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4X5Y-MURP]; Use of Appropriated Funds To Provide Light Refreshments to 
Non-Fed. Participants at EPA Confs., 31 Op. O.L.C. 54, 62–71 (2007) (drawing a line based on 
Congress’s choice whether to tie a restriction to the appropriations provision or not). 
 53. See generally Lawrence, Disappropriation, supra note 8 (explaining how Congress’s 
ability to create “permanent but temporarily funded commitments” has implications for the 
separation of powers). 
 54. See PRINCIPLES OF APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 4, at 2-56 to 2-81. 
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ultimately “draw[ing] money from the Treasury.”55 What process do 
agencies follow in making such decisions?  
As Metzger explains, a “lack of statutorily-mandated procedure 
surrounds . . . administrative decisions on appropriations.”56 This is due 
in large part to the fact that the Administrative Procedure Act 
(“APA”) exempts matters “relating to agency management or 
personnel or to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts” 
from notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements.57  
In practice, agencies take all sorts of approaches to implementing 
and interpreting appropriations, mindful largely of substantive 
expectations and requirements of the GAO and OMB,58 not 
procedural requirements such as those created by the APA. The same 
is true of presidential oversight. Though OMB’s tools to influence 
agency budget execution are in some ways stronger than its tools 
through the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs to influence 
regulatory activity, the exercise of those tools is not subject to the same 
transparency or procedural requirements.59 I am unaware of any 
systemic study of agency practice in this area. We should be careful not 
to infer that the appropriations interpretations in published cases are 
representative. Public accounts offer examples of agencies sometimes 
putting their appropriations interpretations through notice-and-
comment rulemaking, but other times sharing interpretations only 
internally.60  
II.  CONGRESS’S DOMAIN  
A reader trained in ordinary federal legislation and regulation and 
armed with a working understanding of the basic components of 
 
 55. U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 9, cl. 7. 
 56. See Metzger, supra note 13 (manuscript at 33). 
 57. 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (2018). 
 58. See PRINCIPLES OF APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 4, at 2-30 to 2-36 (discussing 
requirements for agencies when they exercise discretion); OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR 
NO. A-11 25-1 (2019), https://budgetcounsel.files.wordpress.com/2019/08/2019-omb-circular-a-11-
full-june-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/W78L-VMNE].  
 59. See Eloise Pasachoff, The President’s Budget as a Source of Agency Policy Control, 125 
YALE L.J. 2182, 2287 (2016) [hereinafter Pasachoff, Agency Policy Control]. 
 60. E.g., Nestor M. Davidson & Ethan J. Leib, Regleprudence—At OIRA and Beyond, 103 
GEO. L.J. 259, 269 (2015) (describing the “often internally facing work” on “a wide variety of 
interpretive tasks”); cf. Pasachoff, Agency Policy Control, supra note 59, at 2224 (describing 
“limits [on] agencies’ ability to state publicly their own views of alternative budget and policy 
priorities”).  
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appropriations would find the actual workings of the appropriations 
process byzantine and incomprehensible. This is because when it 
comes to the annual appropriations process, statutory appropriations 
themselves are just the tip of the iceberg.  
Section A describes how annual appropriations preserve a domain 
of appropriations “law” beyond judicial cognizance and often confuse 
courts and commenters.61 In this domain, each chamber enforces 
commands in documents and portions of documents that are not “law,” 
constitutionally speaking, and that could not be enforced in courts. 
Section B describes how permanent appropriations shrink this domain 
of congressional influence. Section C explains how discretionary 
permanent appropriations also dilute Congress’s influence within its 
domain. 
A terminology note: The diminution in congressional power 
associated with permanent appropriations is not all or nothing; the 
further an appropriations provision extends from its date of enactment, 
the greater the diminution. This Article uses the terminology of 
“annual” and “permanent” because that terminology is common in 
appropriations law and practice today, and these are the most common 
forms of appropriations provisions. That said, its analysis of annual 
appropriations applies to other near-term appropriations and its 
analysis of permanent appropriations applies to other future 
appropriations. 
A. Annual Appropriations Preserve the Domain of Congressionally 
Enforced Appropriations Law  
The fact that many appropriations are available for only one year 
is critical because it gives both the House of Representatives and the 
Senate an effective veto over funding for programs subject to annual 
appropriations, and, therefore, gives them an enduring source of power 
over agencies. Statutes creating agencies or empowering them to 
perform functions are entrenched upon enactment. A majority that 
 
 61. The label of “law” for these written sublegislative commands is not load-bearing for any 
of the analysis that follows, and the label would be controversial in the view of many legal 
theorists. See Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional Practice, 
61 STAN. L. REV. 573, 579 (2008) (using the term “soft law” to refer to rules that are not strictly 
law but “produce the same behavioral effects”); Edward K. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the 
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 369, 374–75, 377 & n.25 (1989) (discussing competing 
conceptions of what makes a written directive “law”). See generally Gillian E. Metzger & Kevin 
M. Stack, Internal Administrative Law, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1239, 1244–45 (2017) (describing 
internal executive branch rules as law). 
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becomes opposed to these statutes has a diminished hope of forcing 
change because amending a statute requires not just the approval of 
the majoritarian House of Representatives (elected by the people 
every two years) but also the countermajoritarian Senate (two per state 
elected in staggered six-year terms regardless of state population) and 
the countermajoritarian electoral college (representatives apportioned 
by state, based largely but not entirely on population). But agencies’ 
need for funding through the annual appropriations process recurs 
every year, so each newly elected House or Senate has the opportunity 
to block an agency or program’s funding. This one-house veto not only 
empowers Congress, it also empowers the majorities that elect a new 
House of Representatives every two years. In short, as it was put at the 
time of the ratification, the federal purse has “two strings, one of which 
[i]s in the hands of the H. of Reps.”62 To release funds, “[b]oth houses 
must concur.”63 The Framers understood this dynamic to be key to the 
potency of the power of the purse.64 
Scholarship describing the power Congress wields through 
appropriations sometimes focuses on statutory enactments, including 
funding restrictions,65 as well as the leverage Congress has in 
negotiations with the president over legislation, which it gets from its 
ability to threaten a “shutdown.”66 However, it is important not to 
overlook another thread of scholarship explaining how Congress uses 
the threat of reduced appropriations to exert influence over agencies.  
Congress uses its power to refuse funding to force agencies to 
comply with appropriations “laws,” including not only the legislative 
enactments described in Part I but also certain legal materials that are 
not part of valid legislation and could not be enforced in court. As 
described below, these include budget justifications, committee 
reports, and transfer and reprogramming pre-approval requirements. 
 
 62. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 275 (Max Farrand ed., 
1911).  
 63. Id.; see also 4 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE 
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 329–30 (photo. reprt. 1941) 
(2d ed. 1836) (statement of Charles Pinckney) (“The House of Representatives . . . [is] the 
moving-spring of the system . . . . [O]n them depend the appropriations of money, and 
consequently all the arrangements of government.”); U.S. House of Representatives v. Mnuchin, 
976 F.3d 1, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (“To put it simply, the Appropriations Clause requires two keys 
to unlock the Treasury, and the House holds one of those keys.”). 
 64. Supra note 21 and accompanying text.  
 65. E.g., Devins, supra note 30, at 456–57. 
 66. See, e.g., Pasachoff, Agency Policy Control, supra note 59, at 2232–34. 
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All of these legal materials are effective in controlling the behavior of 
agencies because each house of Congress enforces them through the 
threat of sanction in future annual appropriations enactments—today, 
they primarily rely on the Appropriations Committees to do so.67  
Budget justifications. Congress and the president have developed 
a sequenced budget process that unfolds each year through which 
annual appropriations for the upcoming fiscal year are considered and 
ultimately enacted.68 The first step in this process is for the president to 
submit their proposed budget to Congress, which includes proposed 
language for each appropriations provision the president recommends 
Congress enact. Along with this proposed language, the president 
submits a lengthy appendix including justifications of how each agency 
expects to spend from the amount requested.69 When Congress enacts 
appropriations as requested and without modification, it “expect[s] 
agencies to adhere to their budget justifications to the extent 
 
 67. ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET: POLITICS, POLICY, PROCESS 271 (3d ed. 2007) 
(“What gives the appropriations reports special force is not their legal status but the fact that the 
next appropriations cycle is always less than one year away. An agency that willfully violates report 
language risks retribution the next time it asks for money.”); see also Jesse M. Cross, When Courts 
Should Ignore Statutory Text, 26 GEO. MASON L. REV. 453, 488–89 (describing the same dynamic). 
See generally RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., THE POWER OF THE PURSE: APPROPRIATIONS POLITICS IN 
CONGRESS (1966) (describing the inner workings of the appropriations process). Indeed, some 
internal agency policies expressly require compliance with these legislatively enforced sources of 
law, notwithstanding the fact that they would not be recognized by a court. CONG. RSCH. SERV., 
R43098, TRANSFER AND REPROGRAMMING OF APPROPRIATIONS 7 & n.35 (2013); see, e.g., FUNDS 
DISTRIB. & CONTROL TEAM, OFF. OF THE CHIEF FIN. OFFICER, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, 
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY BUDGET EXECUTION—FUNDS DISTRIBUTION AND CONTROL 
MANUAL ch. V, at V-1 to V-2 (2006), https://www.directives.doe.gov/directives-documents/100-
series/0135.1-DManual-1a/@@images/file [https://perma.cc/CML3-BRUS] (“[F]or areas known to 
be of interest or concern to Congress, DOE intends to notify congressional committees promptly . . . 
.”); OFF. OF THE UNDER SEC’Y OF DEF., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., BUDGET EXECUTION: PROCESSES 
AND FLEXIBILITY 6 (2015), https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/execution/
Budget_Execution_Tutorial.pptx [https://perma.cc/KU9Z-DD8B] (“Movement of funds within an 
account are governed by agreements between DoD and the congressional authorization and 
appropriations committees.”); 3 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT REGULATION ch. 
6, at 6-6 (2019), https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/documents/fmr/current/03/03_06.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6KZD-K8D5] (setting procedure for reprogramming actions that “require prior 
approval of the congressional committees”). 
 68. SCHICK, supra note 67, at 92 (describing the president’s budget preparation process).  
 69. Id. at 103; see, e.g., OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, A BUDGET FOR AMERICA’S FUTURE 
APPENDIX (2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/appendix_fy21.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PT9W-HT4Z]. 
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practicable.”70 Failure to do so could result in punishment in the next 
year’s appropriation.71  
Committee reports. Several reports are generally produced in the 
run-up to enactment of an annual appropriations act. These include 
committee reports from the House Appropriations Committee and the 
Senate Appropriations Committee, as well as the joint statement of 
managers on the conference report.72 When courts interpret statutes, 
of course, such reports are legislative history that might serve as a 
controversial tool to interpret the text, but normally do not have 
independent meaning. Their effect is very different in the annual 
appropriations process. 
Congress routinely includes “detailed guidance on how funds are 
to be spent” in committee reports and the managers’ statements, rather 
than in appropriations enactments themselves.73 Congress expects 
agencies to abide by the language in these reports, and agencies 
routinely do so.74 Indeed, as with any body of law, the wording of these 
reports has taken on highly specialized meaning that is known and 
understood by agencies and Congress.75 
Transfer and reprogramming pre-approval requirements. 
Moreover, Congress often includes the requirement in statutory text or 
report language that agencies obtain pre-approval from the relevant 
appropriations subcommittee before exercising a transfer authority or 
“reprogramming” funds. These requirements, of course, are not 
 
 70. SCHICK, supra note 67, at 270. 
 71. H.R. REP. NO. 93-662, at 16 (1973) (warning that while the DOD could depart from its 
proffered justifications “[i]n a strictly legal sense,” doing so “would cause Congress to lose 
confidence in the requests made and probably result in reduced appropriations”).  
 72. SCHICK, supra note 67, at 271. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. (“In most cases, . . . agencies comply with the report language.”); see also Cross, supra 
note 67, at 486 (describing Congress’s “power to reward or punish agencies in the future based on 
the extent to which the agencies comply”). As Professors Gluck and Bressman uncover in their 
famous survey of legislative staffers, such staffers themselves see these appropriations conference 
reports as “essentially . . . legislat[ive],” such that the drafting experts of the Office of Legislative 
Counsel—ordinarily tabbed to write only legislation, but not legislative history—are tabbed to 
write such reports as well. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation 
from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part 
I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 980 (2013). 
 75. SCHICK, supra note 67, at 271 (“In these reports, wording is crucial because it conveys 
the extent to which the committee allows latitude in carrying out instructions; report language is 
carefully  
crafted . . . .”). 
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enforceable in court even when they appear in statutory text because 
the delegation of judicially enforceable power to a subcommittee of 
Congress would violate the constitutional requirements of 
bicameralism and presentment.76 They nonetheless bind the agencies 
that follow these requirements and are punished by Congress if they 
do not.77  
B. Permanent Appropriations Circumscribe Congress’s Domain 
Of course, any delegation of legislative power increases the 
quotidian power of the executive branch and thereby shifts the balance 
of power. Delegating the power over spending to the executive in a 
permanent law that is not subject to annual appropriations, however, 
does more than that. It not only grants the executive power, but 
simultaneously takes power away from the legislature. It does so by 
shrinking and diluting the congressional power to refuse funding 
described in the prior subpart.  
For the most part, Congress does not diminish its legislative power 
when it delegates regulatory power to an agency.78 When Congress 
gives an agency power to regulate a subject, Congress’s power to 
regulate that subject through law is largely undiminished. Congress can 
always change the law, and the process for doing so is the same one it 
would be if Congress had never delegated power to the agency in the 
first place. Prior to a delegation of regulatory power to an agency, 
Congress can regulate through bicameralism and presentment, and 
after the delegation, Congress can still do so.  
The appropriations power—particularly the power to refuse 
funding—is different. As discussed in Part II.A, by constitutional 
default each house of Congress has a unicameral power to refuse 
 
 76. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 955–59 (1983). 
 77. See The Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense Authorization Budget Request from the 
Department of Defense: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Armed Servs., 116th Cong. 9 (2019) 
(explaining “gentleman’s agreement” by which DOD sought advance approval from relevant 
committees before reprogramming funds pursuant to its legal authority); Pasachoff, The 
President’s Budget Powers, supra note 36, at 79 (“Some committees expect advance notification 
when transfers or reprogramming above a certain amount are planned, while others expect that 
no transfers or reprogramming will take place without advance approval, sometimes not only by 
the appropriations committees but by the authorizing committees as well.”).  
 78. Programs can become politically entrenched, in which case legislative delegations can 
reduce the power of future Congresses in a political sense. See Daryl Levinson & Benjamin I. 
Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 125 YALE L.J. 400, 463 (2015) (recognizing that a 
new program may bring popular support that makes it politically difficult to undo).  
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funding. But when Congress creates a permanent appropriation, it 
destroys that power to refuse funding as it applies to the subject of the 
appropriation. Prior to a delegation of permanent spending authority, 
each house can influence spending by refusing to fund, and after the 
delegation, neither house can do so.79 Permanent appropriations shrink 
Congress’s domain.80 
C. Permanent Appropriations Dilute Congress’s Power in Its Domain 
Each chamber’s loss of control over some spending is not the only 
way permanent appropriations provisions diminish congressional 
power. The increasing levels of executive discretion to spend without 
Congress’s approval dilutes the importance of the annual 
appropriations process altogether. It increases the executive’s ability to 
fend for itself when Congress tries to punish it by denying funding 
pursuant to the annual appropriations process.  
Professor Randy Kozel unpacks this concept of leverage. 
Discretion as to a particular question or function can be expanded into 
other areas by means of “overreach”—“the government might mix and 
match benefits and burdens in order to affect conduct it has no business 
influencing”—and by means of “aggrandizement”—“enhancing . . . 
influence without operating through proper channels.”81  
There are acute risks of overreach and aggrandizement in 
executive discretion over funding. The potential of explicit conditions 
on funding to influence behavior completely unrelated to the funding 
itself is well explored in the “legislative conditions” context.82 
However, executive discretion over spending means the executive can 
 
 79. See Harrison, supra note 43, at 403 (“A Congress that wanted to commit its successors as 
little as possible to a program of public benefit would authorize or appropriate only for a limited 
period of time.”); id. (“Unless a future Congress musters a majority to the contrary, . . . programs 
[funded by a permanent, indefinite appropriation] commit the expenditure of federal funds for 
all future time.”). 
 80. Provisions in permanent law that enhance executive power include direct permanent 
appropriations, provisions in permanent law permitting agencies to transfer funds within annual 
appropriations from one area to another, and provisions in permanent law that permit agencies 
to generate resources in ways outside of the appropriations process, such as by creating 
instrumentalities for nonappropriated funds. All of these give the executive enduring control over 
spending in ways beyond each chamber’s power to refuse funds in the annual appropriations 
process. 
 81. Randy J. Kozel, Leverage, 61 B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 36, 39–41), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3566436 [https://perma.cc/UJ2J-GDHJ]. 
 82. See generally, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Anti-Leveraging Principle and the Spending 
Clause After NFIB, 101 GEO. L.J. 861 (2013) (discussing this doctrine). 
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impose conditions, too, and the executive’s conditions need not be 
public or explicit. The president and agencies can leverage the promise 
of funding, or the threat of denying funding, to compel behavior by 
third parties or Congress elsewhere that they could not otherwise 
compel. And these third parties have limited ability to challenge such 
conditions without upsetting the “hand that feeds.”  
In fact, two examples illustrating the dangerous potential of the 
power to refuse funding have taken place in the past few years. The 
first instance occurred when President Donald Trump attempted to 
pressure Ukraine into investigating his political rival by impounding 
appropriated military aid pending the country’s agreement to do so.83 
And the second took place more recently when Trump attempted to 
withhold funding for the World Health Organization (“WHO”).84 
It is important to note that the public quickly learned about both 
the Ukraine and the WHO examples, and they were controversial 
because the executive discretion over the implicated expenditures was 
subject to the annual appropriations process.85 They occurred within 
Congress’s domain. Yes, Congress granted the executive some 
discretion over funding for Ukraine and the WHO, but it held a purse 
string to ensure it could effectively oversee the executive’s use of that 
discretion.  
Executive discretion over permanently appropriated funding 
brings the same risks of leverage without meaningful hope of either a 
legislative or a judicial check. Congress loses its direct oversight role 
over permanently funded programs in the annual appropriations 
process. Meanwhile, judicial review of presidential discretion over 
spending is unlikely, especially where the executive declines to spend. 
 
 83. See H.R. REP. NO. 116-346, at 2 (2019) (describing the president as a “threat to national 
security and the Constitution”). 
 84. Teo Armus, Trump Threatens To Permanently Cut WHO Funding, Leave Body If Changes 
Aren’t Made Within 30 Days, WASH. POST (May 19, 2020, 8:46 AM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/05/19/who-funding-trump [https://perma.cc/4QR5-ZR7T]. 
 85. Indeed, the Ukraine aid impoundment was subject to congressional alarm and 
investigation even before a whistleblower complaint revealed the extortion attempt behind it. See 
Letter from John Yarmuth, Chairman, H. Comm. on the Budget to The Hon. Mick Mulvaney, 
Acting Chief of Staff, The White House (Sept. 18, 2019), https://budget.house.gov/sites/
democrats.budget.house.gov/files/documents/OMB%20Letter_081919_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/
CA4P-H6TK] (raising concerns about impoundment of Ukraine funds). The discovery ultimately 
led to the president’s impeachment. See Emily Cochrane, Eric Lipton & Chris Cameron, G.A.O. 
Report Says Trump Administration Broke Law in Withholding Ukraine Aid, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 
2020), https://nyti.ms/2FXR5e2 [https://perma.cc/2X7Z-PHT3]. 
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Entities who hope for funding but who are denied may not be able to 
generate standing—unattainable without the ability to point to a 
specific denial—unless the approvals process is tightly controlled by 
law.86 And, as Professor Mila Sohoni points out in her discussion of 
executive creation of new entitlements, a lawsuit to challenge the grant 
of funding to others is unlikely without taxpayer standing.87  
III.  CHEVRON FOR APPROPRIATIONS? 
The distinction between annual appropriations provisions, which 
preserve congressional authority, and permanent appropriations 
provisions, which diminish it, can have implications for administrative 
law doctrine. The open doctrinal question of whether courts should 
defer to agency interpretations of appropriations provisions—
otherwise known as Chevron for appropriations—offers an important 
example. This Part explains why.  
Section A offers a refresher on Chevron. Section B explains that 
when interpreting appropriations provisions, courts have come to 
varying conclusions about whether to apply an interpretive 
presumption to appropriations provisions—often either deferring or 
applying a rule of narrow interpretation—or simply to interpret them 
de novo. Section C argues that courts should presumptively deny 
deference for permanent appropriations provisions, but not for annual 
appropriations provisions. Section D argues that courts should 
consider the unique nature of annual and permanent appropriations in 
evaluating whether to defer in particular cases. Section E identifies 
doctrinal support for tailoring deference to the nature of annual and 
permanent appropriations.  
A. A Chevron Refresher 
When a federal administrative agency has interpreted an 
ambiguous statutory provision, courts may defer to that agency’s 
 
 86. Sherley v. Sebelius is an exception that illustrates the difficulty that those who wish for 
but do not receive funding have in bringing suit. 610 F.3d 69, 70 (D.C. Cir. 2010). There, the D.C. 
Circuit found that a grant applicant had standing to challenge a funding award to a competitor, 
but only because the applicant had formally applied for and been denied the grant and because 
the award to the competitor of the zero-sum grant pool diminished the challenger’s likelihood of 
being funded. Id. at 72–74. 
 87. See Sohoni, supra note 19, at 1685 (addressing a lack of judicial review of executive 
discretion over spending, as well as the possibility of political entrenchment when the executive 
creates entitlements).  
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interpretation and treat its interpretation as binding under Chevron. 
Doctrinally, courts decide whether to treat an agency’s interpretation 
as binding in three steps, though each has substeps and the boundaries 
between them can blur. The steps are referred to as Chevron Step 
Zero, Chevron Step One, and Chevron Step Two.  
Step Zero explores the character of the statute at issue and the 
agency interpretation of that statute to decide whether to proceed. 
Some statutes and some agency interpretations are simply ineligible for 
deference at this step. Step Zero doctrine “is a mess.”88 Under Mead, 
courts ask whether Congress intended the agency to be able to act with 
the force of law and, if so, whether the agency has utilized its force-of-
law authority in developing its interpretation.89 Courts also insist at 
Step Zero that the statute the agency has interpreted be one the agency 
implements.90 The Supreme Court has instructed that this will often be 
true for agency interpretations developed through statutorily 
authorized notice-and-comment processes, but not always.91  
Courts applying the Mead test draw further guidance, beyond 
these presumptions, from factors articulated by the Supreme Court in 
Barnhart v. Walton92: “[T]he interstitial nature of the legal question, 
the related expertise of the Agency, the importance of the question to 
administration of the statute, the complexity of that administration, 
and the careful consideration the Agency has given the question over 
a long period of time.”93 Professors Kristin Hickman and Aaron 
Nielson highlight a related but somewhat more fundamental set of 
considerations that courts and scholars tend to focus on in mapping 
Chevron’s domain: expertise (Would judicial resolution of ambiguities 
reduce the correctness of decisions reached, especially complicated 
scientific and technical questions?), political accountability (Would 
agency determination entail greater opportunities for public 
 
 88. Kristin E. Hickman & Aaron L. Nielson, Narrowing Chevron’s Domain, 70 DUKE L.J. 
931, 977 (2021).  
 89. See Eric R. Womack, Into the Third Era of Administrative Law: An Empirical Study of 
the Supreme Court’s Retreat from Chevron Principles in United States v. Mead, 107 DICK. L. REV. 
289, 309–13 (2002). 
 90. See RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. & KRISTIN E. HICKMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 
§ 3.6.2 (6th ed. 2020).  
 91. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000). 
 92. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002). 
 93. Id. at 222. 
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participation?), and delegation (Is there some indication that Congress 
intended agencies rather than that courts to resolve ambiguities?).94  
If Step Zero cuts against deference, that ends the inquiry. If it cuts 
in favor, courts proceed to Steps One and Two. Step One explores the 
text of the statute, searching for ambiguity.95 Step One depends entirely 
on ordinary questions of statutory interpretation, though the meaning 
of “ambiguity” and the decision of which statutory tools to employ at 
Step One are crucial and thorny questions.96 If a statute is ambiguous, 
then the court proceeds to Step Two. If not, the court refuses 
deference. 
Step Two does two things. What can be thought of as the statutory 
component of Step Two explores the text of the statute, this time 
focusing on the consistencies between the agency’s interpretation and 
the scope of the textual ambiguity. Depending on the way a court 
frames Step One, this component merges with that inquiry. The more 
substantive component of Step Two evaluates the traditional 
administrative law question of whether the agency’s policy decision of 
how to resolve the statutory ambiguity is itself arbitrary and 
capricious.97  
Why does this complicated doctrine get so much attention? 
Because it is one of the most important levers that courts have to 
modulate the balance of power between themselves and agencies.98 
Congress has used its legislative power to entrench broad and 
significant authority in the administrative state, most of which it gives 
directly to agencies, part of the executive branch (some would say the 
fourth branch, others the second; I do not mean to engage the unitary 
executive debate). But legislation inevitably, and often intentionally, 
entails ambiguities. The question of what to do about those ambiguities 
is an interpretive one that, under the U.S. Constitution, falls by default 
within the authority of the third branch, the courts. So, by default, 
 
 94. See Hickman & Nielson, supra note 88, at 938. Uniformity also comes up as a factor, 
PIERCE & HICKMAN, supra note 90, § 3.8, but I do not evaluate it separately here on the 
assumption that it is unlikely that one agency could become subject to competing orders about 
the legality of its spending from a particular appropriations provision, even without Chevron. 
 95. PIERCE & HICKMAN, supra note 90, § 3.5.1. 
 96. Id. 
 97. See id. (discussing equivalence of Step Two and arbitrary and capricious review). 
 98. Cf. Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 761 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (applying 
Chevron “wrests from Courts the ultimate interpretive authority to ‘say what the law is’ and hands 
it over to the Executive” (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803))). 
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congressional delegations give some power to agencies (through clear 
language) and some power to courts (through ambiguities). 
Chevron does two distinct things to ambiguities to change the 
constitutional default. First, Chevron delegates (or deems Congress to 
have delegated) the power entailed in resolving ambiguities to agencies 
rather than the constitutional default, courts. It thereby consolidates 
the power given away by Congress through delegations in the executive 
branch rather than leaving that power divided between the executive 
and the judiciary.  
Second, Chevron preserves ambiguities and the delegated power 
they entail. In the act of interpreting an ambiguity, an appellate court 
solidifies it. Stare decisis both denies future courts the option of 
changing the interpretation, with rare exceptions, and grants those 
regulated by the law predictability about the meaning of the previously 
uncertain provision.99 This anti-entrenchment function of Chevron is 
not subsidiary to its delegation function. It is independent. An agency 
cannot choose to solidify the meaning of an ambiguous provision of law 
even if it wants to. Inevitably, a subsequent agency head, or president, 
might choose to change it. 
B. Courts’ Varied Approaches to Chevron for Appropriations 
Judicial decisions regarding the applicability of Chevron to 
appropriations are relatively rare. Courts’ approaches in these 
relatively few reported instances have run the gamut. Some courts have 
applied a clear statement rule against funding rather than Chevron, 
others have applied a categorical bar that treats appropriations as 
exceptional and ineligible for deference, and still others have applied 
the tests from Mead and Barnhart to preclude and to find deference—
sometimes based on the process used by an agency to reach its 
interpretation. Other courts have given Chevron deference to 
appropriations provisions without questioning whether appropriations 
might be different.  
1. Rule of Narrow Interpretation in ACA Case.  The district court 
for the District of Columbia applied a clear statement rule requiring 
that appropriations be interpreted narrowly in United States House of 
 
 99. See Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore 
Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1304–05 (2007) (describing tension between deference under 
Chevron and Skidmore and stare decisis). 
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Representatives v. Burwell100 (against funding). In this case, the House 
of Representatives challenged the expenditure of funds from the 
permanent, indefinite refundable tax credit appropriation. The 
expenditure was used for an ACA subsidy that the House alleged 
required an annual appropriation.101 The district court read the 
“purpose statute,” 31 U.S.C. § 1301(d), to mandate such a clear 
statement rule.102 This approach foreclosed any possibility of Chevron 
deference.103  
I have explained elsewhere the misunderstanding of § 1301(d) on 
which this clear statement rule approach rests.104 That provision creates 
a clear statement rule for the question of whether an enactment creates 
an appropriation; however, it does not address the scope of an 
appropriation once created.105  
In California v. Trump,106 the district court for the Northern 
District of California addressed the same question that had been 
presented in House v. Burwell about the meaning of the refundable tax 
credit appropriation.107 (By that time, the Trump administration had 
halted the payment on the ground that it lacked an appropriation, so 
the suit was brought by states arguing the Trump administration had 
gotten that judgment wrong.108 Thus, the position of the agency was 
reversed but the legal question was identical.) It refused to find a clear 
statement rule based in § 1301(d) for the reason just explained—the 
provision governs the question of whether an enactment appropriates 
funds, not the subsidiary question of the scope of the appropriation 
 
 100. U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 185 F. Supp. 3d 165 (D.D.C. 2016), vacated in 
part sub nom. U.S. House of Representatives v. Azar, No. 14-CV-01967, 2018 WL 8576647 
(D.D.C. May 18, 2018).  
 101. Burwell, 185 F. Supp. 3d at 168, 170, 188. 
 102. See id. at 174 (“[A]n appropriation cannot be inferred . . . . ‘A law may be construed to 
make an appropriation . . . only if the law specifically states that an appropriation is made.’” 
(quoting 31 U.S.C. § 1301(d) (2018))). 
 103. See id. at 188 (rejecting any ambiguity in the statute’s terms and relying in part on 
§ 1301(d) to preclude the agency’s proposed interpretation). 
 104. Lawrence, Disappropriation, supra note 8, at 76. 
 105. Id. 
 106. California v. Trump, 267 F. Supp. 3d 1119 (N.D. Cal. 2017). 
 107. See id. at 1124–26. 
 108. Id. at 1126. 
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thus made.109 Nonetheless, the California v. Trump court hinted at a 
rule of narrow interpretation based in the separation of powers.110  
2. Chevron for Appropriations in Stem Cell and Other Cases.  The 
fullest discussion in a case finding Chevron Step Zero satisfied and 
deference applicable is in Norton Construction Co. v. United States 
Army Corps of Engineers.111 There, the court granted Chevron 
deference to an agency’s interpretation of an appropriations rider’s 
funding restriction that prohibited the use of funds in an annual 
appropriation for a permit application.112 The court held that 
“[b]ecause this was an appropriations bill related to matters already 
delegated to the Corps, it is reasonable to assume that to the extent the 
Congress was not clear it implicitly delegated interpretation of section 
103 to the Corps.”113 That said, the court declined to address the 
question of whether the appropriations riders counted as the Corps’s 
“governing statute” because neither party had raised it.114  
Several other cases have explicitly deferred to agencies’ 
interpretations of annual appropriations provisions. These include 
district court decisions addressing agencies’ interpretations of an 
appropriation’s affirmative purpose statement115 and funding 
 
 109. Id. at 1132 (“[T]he clear-statement rule announced in [§ 1301(d)] is of limited relevance 
here, since . . . the disagreement concerns the scope of that appropriation, not its existence.”). 
 110. The court recognized the constitutional implications in the appropriations context: 
Looming over this whole discussion is the fact that the parties are disputing the 
meaning of an appropriations statute, not just any statute . . . . [T]he role of the 
Appropriations Clause in enforcing the constitutional separation of powers provides 
reason for caution in adopting a reading of an appropriations statute broader than the 
one most obviously provided by the text.  
Id. (citing U.S. Dep’t of the Navy v. FLRA, 665 F.3d 1339, 1347 (D.C. Cir. 2012)). 
 111. Norton Constr. Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 03-CV-2257, 2007 WL 1431907 
(N.D. Ohio May 14, 2007). 
 112. Id. at *1, *5. 
 113. Id. at *4. 
 114. Norton Constr. Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 03-CV-2257, 2005 WL 8168489, 
at *5 n.4 (N.D. Ohio May 10, 2005), vacated, No. 03-CV-2257, 2005 WL 8168489 (N.D. Ohio June 
22, 2006) (“The Court is not entirely convinced that the appropriations riders herein constitute 
the Corps’ ‘governing statute,’ to which Chevron principles would apply. However, as neither 
party raises the issue, the Court has not addressed it herein.”). 
 115. Healthy Teen Network v. Azar, 322 F. Supp. 3d 647, 659 n.16 (D. Md. 2018) (recognizing 
that “HHS may well receive [Chevron] deference on its own interpretation of the relevant factors” 
of the affirmative purpose statement of the annual appropriations act); see also Gay Men’s Health 
Crisis v. Sullivan, 733 F. Supp. 619, 634 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (“[T]his Court must defer to an agency’s 
reasonable construction of its own enabling legislation and of the appropriations bills that fund 
it.”).  
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restrictions.116 Perhaps the most famous case in this category is the D.C. 
Circuit’s decision in Sherley v. Sebelius117 regarding the applicability of 
the Dickey-Wicker Amendment—a funding restriction—to embryonic 
stem cell research.118 The funding restriction had been included in the 
National Institutes of Health’s annual appropriations provisions each 
year since 1996.119 The agency was able to, and did, go through notice-
and-comment rulemaking in developing its interpretation that the 
amendment did not bar funding for certain stem cell research.120 The 
D.C. Circuit cited that fact, treated the case as a relatively 
straightforward Chevron case, and ultimately deferred to the agency’s 
interpretation.  
3. Categorical Ineligibility for Deference in Western Watersheds 
Reflects Stray Language Taking Root.  One district court decision held 
that agency interpretations of annual appropriations are categorically 
ineligible for deference at Chevron Step Zero because agencies do not 
administer “budget bills.”121 In Western Watersheds Project v. United 
States Forest Service,122 the District of Idaho refused to defer to the 
Forest Service’s interpretation of a funding restriction in the 
Department of Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies 
Appropriations Act of 2012.123  
Western Watersheds may be a budding example of a regrettable 
phenomenon familiar in the law: a case is taken to have held something 
it did not hold based on an out-of-context quote, but the holding 
 
 116. Moore v. Navy Pub. Works Ctr., 139 F. Supp. 2d 1349, 1357–58 (N.D. Fla. 2001) 
(deferring to the Navy’s interpretation of a funding restriction in the DOD Appropriations Act). 
 117. Sherley v. Sebelius, 644 F.3d 388 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 118. Id. at 389–90.  
 119. Id. at 390. 
 120. Id. at 391. 
 121. W. Watersheds Project v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. 12-cv-00286, 2012 WL 2254206, at *1 (D. 
Idaho June 15, 2012). 
 122. W. Watersheds Project v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. 12-cv-00286, 2012 WL 2254206 (D. Idaho 
June 15, 2012). 
 123. The District Court reasoned that: 
Chevron deference does not apply to cases where an agency interprets a statute that it 
does not administer and therefore falls outside its scope of expertise. The Forest 
Service Administers its organic statute, NFMA, not budget bills . . . . Reconciling the 
appropriations rider with NFMA’s substantive obligations is therefore a purely legal 
question warranting a less deferential standard.  
Id. at *1 (citation omitted) (referring to the “appropriations rider” in the Department of the 
Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-74, div. 
E, tit. IV, § 431, 125 Stat. 985, 1047). 
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becomes real when a subsequent case relies on its misinterpretation of 
the quote to make new law. In the Western Watersheds case, the only 
case to date to hold appropriations categorically ineligible for 
deference, the only precedent that the district court cited in coming to 
that holding was a Ninth Circuit Federal Labor Relations Authority 
(“FLRA”) case.124 Similarly, in an insightful analysis of King v. Burwell 
that elsewhere recognizes the question is not settled, Sohoni cites a 
D.C. Circuit case, United States Department of the Navy v. FLRA,125 as 
having held that “interpretations of appropriations statutes by agencies 
. . . are not entitled to deference.”126  
The Ninth and D.C. Circuits’ FLRA cases do not support the 
conclusion for which they are cited—that agencies do not receive 
deference for their interpretations of appropriations. They instead deal 
with a different, far simpler issue. The FLRA oversees labor relations 
within the federal government, and thus frequently engages with and 
is tasked with interpreting legislation that applies to other agencies.127 
Not surprisingly then, in several somewhat recent cases to reach the 
circuit courts, the issue in dispute has been the FLRA’s interpretation 
of a provision in an appropriations statute applicable to another 
agency.128  
Of course, the FLRA should not receive deference when it 
interprets a statutory provision that applies to another agency—
whether that provision is in an appropriation or not—because such a 
provision is not one that Congress has “entrusted the [FLRA] to 
administer.”129 That is what these FLRA cases have held. However, the 
language the circuits have used can be read out of context to comment 
on the applicability of Chevron to appropriations generally. For 
example, in one case the D.C. Circuit said that “the court owes no 
 
 124. Id. (citing Ass’n of Civilian Technicians, Silver Barons Chapter v. FLRA, 200 F.3d 590, 
592 (9th Cir. 2000)).  
 125. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy v. FLRA, 665 F.3d 1339 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 126. Mila Sohoni, King’s Domain, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1419, 1428 (2018).  
 127. E.g., NLRB v. FLRA, 613 F.3d 275, 277–78 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (addressing dispute between 
FLRA and NLRB about how to shape bargaining units at NLRB that turned on the meaning of 
separation of functions provisions governing the NLRB general counsel in the National Labor 
Relations Act).  
 128. See Dep’t of the Navy, 665 F.3d at 1348; Ass’n of Civilian Technicians, P.R. Army Chapter 
v. FLRA, 370 F.3d 1214, 1221–22 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Ass’n of Civilian Technicians, Tony 
Kempenich Mem’l Chapter 21 v. FLRA, 269 F.3d 1119, 1121 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Silver Barons 
Chapter, 200 F.3d at 592.  
 129. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). 
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deference to FLRA’s interpretation of the appropriations act.”130 
Reading this line alone, a reader might take the court to have refused 
deference based on the nature of the enactment rather than the agency 
doing the interpreting. In another case, the D.C. Circuit held that 
another agency’s appropriation statute was “not within [FLRA’s] area 
of expertise.”131 In a similar vein, the Ninth Circuit noted that “courts 
do not owe deference to an agency’s interpretation of a statute it is not 
charged with administering” and went on to refuse deference to the 
FLRA’s interpretation of a DOD Appropriations Act because “the 
FLRA is not charged with administering the DOD Appropriations 
Act.”132 Although the question of Chevron’s applicability to 
appropriations is interesting and important, these FLRA cases do not 
offer an answer.  
4. Application of Barnhart Factors To Reject Deference in Wall 
Case.  Most recently, the Ninth Circuit refused to apply Chevron 
deference to the Trump administration’s interpretation of an annual 
transfer authority. In early 2019, the federal government went through 
the longest partial shutdown in its history in a standoff between 
Democrats, who had received majority support in the 2018 midterms 
and thus controlled the House of Representatives, and Trump, who 
had received a majority of the electoral votes in 2016.133 The standoff 
was about whether Congress would provide the funds the president 
wanted to build a wall along the southern border.134 
 
 130. P.R. Army Chapter, 370 F.3d at 1221 (citing Kempenich Memorial Chapter, 269 F.3d at 
1121). Kempenich explained that the court would owe deference to FLRA’s interpretation of the 
Federal Service Labor Management Relations Act, but not to “FLRA’s interpretation of a statute 
not committed to the Authority’s administration,” such as the DOD Appropriations Act. 269 F.3d 
at 1121. 
 131. Dep’t of the Navy, 665 F.3d at 1348 (repeating that the FLRA receives deference when 
interpreting its “organic statute” but it “receives no deference, however, when it ‘has 
endeavored to reconcile its organic statute with another statute’—such as a federal 
appropriations statute—‘not within its area of expertise’” (quoting U.S. Dep’t of the Air 
Force v. FLRA, 648 F.3d 841, 846 (D.C. Cir. 2011))). 
 132. Silver Barons Chapter, 200 F.3d at 592.  
 133. Kristina Peterson, Michael C. Bender & Rebecca Ballhaus, Shutdown Breaks Record for 
Longest in Modern History, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 13, 2019, 12:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
trump-plays-down-emergency-option-to-get-wall-funding-11547238564 [perma.cc/MF4B-JZGM]. 
 134. See Aaron Blake, Trump’s Extraordinary Oval Office Squabble with Chuck Schumer and 
Nancy Pelosi, Annotated, WASH. POST (Dec. 11, 2018, 1:02 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/2018/12/11/trumps-extraordinary-oval-office-squabble-with-chuck-schumer-nancy-pelosi-
annotated [https://perma.cc/5D32-YRZ6] (“TRUMP: . . . If we don’t get what we want one way or 
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The standoff ended with a victory of sorts for Democrats, who 
appropriated $1.375 billion for fencing along the Rio Grande,135 not the 
$5 billion the president had requested for a “down payment” on a 
longer wall.136 However, on the same day that he signed the 
appropriations into law, Trump announced that he would nonetheless 
pay for a longer wall using funds cobbled together through various 
appropriations authorities. Specifically, the White House issued a 
“victory” fact sheet explaining the complex web of appropriations 
provisions it would utilize to generate roughly $6.8 billion in funding 
for wall construction.137  
The money would primarily come through two complicated and 
legally controversial appropriations two-steps that used a combination 
of annual transfer authorities and permanent conditional funding 
authorities to tap into and redirect previously appropriated annual 
funds. Section 8005 of the DOD Appropriations Act of 2019 would be 
used to transfer $2.5 billion in existing appropriations—which had been 
enacted in September 2018—into a DOD counterdrug activities 
account.138 The available purposes for that account would then, 
through operation of the permanent conditional funding authority for 
counternarcotics operations in 10 U.S.C. § 284, be expanded to include 
wall construction.139 In a separate but similarly complicated two-step, 
the president would declare a national emergency, which would 
allegedly make it possible for the secretary of defense to utilize another 
permanent conditional funding authority, 10 U.S.C. § 2808, to put 
another $3.6 billion in previously appropriated annual funds toward 
 
the other, whether it’s through you, through a military, through anything you want to call, I will shut 
down the government, absolutely . . . . I’m going to shut it down for border security.”).  
 135. See Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-6, div. 
A, tit. II, § 230(a)(1), 133 Stat. 15, 28. 
 136. Ben Zimmer, Trump’s ‘Down Payment’ Trick, ATLANTIC (Jan. 25, 2019), https://
www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2019/01/the-history-behind-trumps-down-payment-
trick/581275 [https://perma.cc/FL2X-KAFR]. 
 137. See President Donald J. Trump’s Border Security Victory, WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 15, 
2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trumps-border-
security-victory [https://perma.cc/B6LC-9ZGB] [hereafter Victory Fact Sheet]. 
 138. See id. For the operation of § 8005 transfers, see supra note 39 and accompanying text.  
 139. See Victory Fact Sheet, supra note 137 (referencing 10 U.S.C. § 284 (2018), which permits 
support to be provided for “[c]onstruction of roads and fences and installation of lighting to block 
drug smuggling corridors across international boundaries of the United States”). 
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wall construction.140 The remaining $700 million would come directly 
from the Treasury Forfeiture Fund.141  
In Ninth Circuit litigation regarding the $2.5 billion in funding 
tapped through the § 8005 transfer, the Court squarely addressed 
whether to give Chevron deference to the agency’s interpretation of 
that annual transfer authority.142 Section 8005 permits the secretary of 
defense to transfer up to $4 billion in DOD working capital funds 
appropriated in the 2019 appropriations act “for military functions 
(except military construction) . . . Provided, That such authority to 
transfer may not be used . . . where the item for which funds are 
requested has been denied by the Congress.”143 Plaintiffs challenging 
the transfer argued that wall construction was “military construction” 
and so ineligible for transfer.144 They also argued that Congress had 
affirmatively denied funds for wall construction by refusing to grant 
them when the president asked.145 The DOD disagreed on both 
counts.146 
Although the government did not raise the issue of Chevron 
deference,147 the Ninth Circuit addressed it anyway in upholding a 
preliminary injunction, which was ultimately stayed by the Supreme 
Court. It conducted a Step Zero analysis by applying the Barnhart 
factors one by one, finding they weighed against deference.148 
Specifically, it concluded that the agency’s interpretation of § 8005 was 
not entitled to deference at Chevron Step Zero because the DOD’s 
authorizing and appropriations statutes did not contain an “explicit 
grant of rulemaking power” as the agency lacked expertise to 
determine whether funds had been “denied by the Congress.”149 This 
happened due to the agency not engaging in notice-and-comment 
rulemaking when coming to its interpretation, and because the 
 
 140. See Victory Fact Sheet, supra note 137. 
 141. Id. The fund is governed by 31 U.S.C. § 9705(a) (2018).  
 142. Sierra Club v. Trump, 929 F.3d 670, 692–93 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 143. Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-245, div. A, tit. VIII, 
§ 8005, 132 Stat. 2982, 2999.  
 144. Sierra Club, 929 F.3d at 683. 
 145. Id.  
 146. Id. at 683, 690. 
 147. Id. (“Defendants did not argue in their briefing to the district court, their stay motion, or 
their supplemental briefing that their contrary interpretation of section 8005 is entitled to agency 
deference.”). 
 148. Id. at 692–93. 
 149. Id. 
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agency’s interpretation had apparently been decided upon “in a matter 
of weeks.”150  
C. A Bifurcated Approach 
What approach to Chevron for appropriations should future 
courts employ and, ultimately, should the judiciary settle on? Courts’ 
default may be to follow the Ninth Circuit by simply applying a literal 
version of the Barnhart factors to any appropriations interpretation 
they confront as if it were an interpretation of ordinary legislation, 
without tailoring deference to the appropriations context.151  
Literal application of the Barnhart factors will tend to favor 
deference for permanent appropriations provisions and appropriations 
riders that are regularly included in legislation with identical language. 
The “long period of time” factor favors permanent appropriations for 
obvious reasons. The ephemeral nature of annual appropriations 
makes notice-and-comment rulemaking difficult except in the case of 
language reenacted year after year, so the question of whether the 
agency went through notice and comment similarly favors permanent 
appropriations.152 (Whether and how the “interstitial nature of the 
legal question” and “expertise of the agency” will come into play does 
not obviously depend on the duration of the appropriation provision at 
issue.) 
The “tools” by which a tightening Chevron Step Zero limits 
deference—in particular, by demanding notice and comment153—are a 
poor fit for the distinctive considerations presented by appropriations. 
In light of the differing impacts of annual and permanent 
appropriations provisions on the separation of powers described in 
Part II, the results dictated by literal application of the Barnhart factors 
would be upside-down if courts’ goal is to avoid interference with the 
separation of powers. Deference for permanent appropriations 
diminishes legislative power, and deference for annual appropriations 
is consistent with Congress’s expectation of a back-and-forth with 
agencies in which they will comply not only with appropriations 
provisions but also with various unicameral “legal” requirements.  
 
 150. Id.  
 151. See supra Part III.B.4. 
 152. See, e.g., Sherley v. Sebelius, 644 F.3d 388, 395–96 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (deferring under 
Chevron to an agency interpretation of an annual appropriations provision reenacted in multiple 
years, that had been subject to notice and comment). 
 153. Hickman & Nielson, supra note 88, at 995–96.  
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Courts should take a bifurcated approach to Chevron for 
appropriations instead of an untailored, literal application of tests from 
Mead or Barnhart. As elaborated upon below, permanent 
appropriations provisions should be presumptively ineligible for 
deference, but not annual appropriations provisions.  
1. Assumptions.  The prescriptions below rest on several 
normative assumptions about how courts “should” decide questions 
about deference, though the analysis endeavors to identify points of 
departure for those who do not share these assumptions. These include 
assumptions common to Chevron analysis about the role of intent, 
expertise, political accountability, and history. One is that of presumed 
intent, that courts should look for particularized indicia that Congress 
itself would (or would not) want or expect deference.154 Two more are 
that Chevron’s applicability should be considered in light of whether 
deference would tend to promote expertise and political 
accountability.155 Another—drawn from the idea of presumed intent as 
well as rule-of-law values—is that courts’ historical application (or 
refusal) of deference for types of cases should inform decisions about 
related cases’ eligibility for deference in the future.156 
The driving assumption here is newer to Chevron analysis. It is 
that courts, in resolving open interpretive questions, should endeavor 
not to diminish legislative power in the appropriations process. In other 
words, the separation of powers analysis in Part II should influence 
courts’ decisions about deference, and they should disfavor approaches 
that interfere unnecessarily with Congress’s domain—at least where 
considerations of expertise, accountability, presumed intent, and 
precedent do not favor deference. 
 
 154. Chevron is based in part on a presumption about congressional intent, that Congress 
intended certain ambiguities to be resolved by agencies rather than courts. Thomas W. Merrill & 
Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 872 (2001). 
 155. Supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 156. City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 301–05 (2013) (looking to past judicial precedent 
in analogous cases in considering availability of deference). 
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This assumption may be controversial among legal scholars,157 but 
it is defensible,158 and courts have employed it.159 Chevron calibrates 
 
 157. Scholars have occasionally argued that it is better for Congress to engage in policymaking 
through ordinary legislation, which is controlled in part by authorizing committees, than through 
appropriations legislation, which is controlled by appropriations committees. See Jack M. 
Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 88–90 (2006) (discussing 
critiques of appropriations riders and earmarks); Brannon P. Denning & Brooks R. Smith, Uneasy 
Riders: The Case for a Truth-in-Legislation Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 957, 969–71 
(expressing concern about collective action problems inherent in the appropriations process); 
Elizabeth Garrett, Legislating Chevron, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2637, 2668 (2003) (describing agency- 
and program-specific appropriations riders abrogating Chevron and stating that “[u]sing the 
appropriations process is not the best way to make [interpretive] decision[s]”); Devins, supra note 
30, at 464 (“Appropriations-based policymaking may be useful, but there are strong reasons to 
caution against it.”); id. at 464–65 (listing reasons weighing against appropriations-based 
policymaking, including the fact that appropriations bypass authorizing committees and their 
staffs); Chuzi, supra note 26, at 1005–06 (describing benefits of including authorizing committees 
in the legislative process).  
 158. See Metzger, supra note 13 (manuscript at 6, 32–39) (arguing that administrative law 
doctrine should not disfavor governing through appropriations). Professor Price’s defense of 
congressional power in annual appropriations is well stated:  
[I]n a world of broad delegations and expansive executive authority, Congress’s power 
of the purse is the single feature of our system that most effectively guarantees an 
ongoing political constraint on the president’s authority to set policy unilaterally. One 
might say that if it did not exist we would have had to invent it. 
Price, supra note 22, at 369; cf.  Jonathan H. Adler & Christopher J. Walker, Delegation and Time, 
105 IOWA L. REV. 1931, 1940–46, 1974–93 (2020) (a sustained defense of giving Congress 
evergreen influence over agency behavior to overcome democratic accountability problems with 
permanent delegations). Arguments in favor of respecting rather than marginalizing 
appropriations are particularly strong when it comes to calibrating Chevron deference. Even 
critics of the use of the appropriations process to influence policy have made such arguments from 
the perspective of Congress, framing the choice as one Congress must make between influencing 
policy through permanent law and influencing policy through annual appropriations. They have 
not advocated for a role for courts in discouraging some forms of congressional influence or 
encouraging others. Such a role would be inconsistent with the view that courts should not seek 
to interfere with the balance of powers or Congress’s use of its appropriations power. See In re 
Austrian & German Holocaust Litig., 250 F.3d 156, 163–64 (2d Cir. 2001) (“The doctrine of 
separation of powers prohibits the federal courts from excursions into areas committed to the 
Executive Branch or the Legislative Branch.”); Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997 (1979) 
(Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The Judicial Branch should not decide issues affecting 
the allocation of power between the President and Congress until the political branches reach a 
constitutional impasse.”); Michael Sant’Ambrogio, Legislative Exhaustion, 58 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1253, 1257 n.3 (2017) (collecting sources supporting the idea that the political branches 
should “resolv[e] their differences through nonjudicial means”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra 
note 10, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The judiciary . . . has no influence over either the sword 
or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society, and can take no 
active resolution whatever.”). Moreover, there is no reason to assume that courts, by discouraging 
legislative influence through the appropriations process, simultaneously encourage Congress to 
act through permanent legislation; they may simply discourage congressional influence 
altogether. 
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the balance of power between the second and third branches—agencies 
and courts; it is a tool by which courts can give to agencies the power 
that Congress otherwise delegates to courts when it writes ambiguous 
statutes. Appropriations calibrate the balance of power between the 
first and second branches—Congress and agencies; they are a tool 
Congress reserves even as it gives away some of its power in 
entrenched legislation to agencies (and perhaps courts), thereby 
preserving some enduring influence for itself. Courts avoid 
interference with the political branches by taking account of this 
interaction in evaluating deference. 
One additional normative assumption in the discussion that 
follows is that courts’ approach to interpreting appropriations should 
also seek to avoid systematically favoring or disfavoring social 
ordering, such as federal spending. This assumption also may be 
controversial, though it is defensible.160  
2. Against Deference for Permanent Appropriations.  When it 
comes to permanent appropriations provisions, Chevron is a big deal. 
In this context, Chevron’s delegation function diminishes legislative 
power by expanding a potent form of presidential power. Moreover, 
when applied to permanent appropriations, Chevron’s anti-
entrenchment function frustrates congressional budgeting, and 
undermines spending programs. It also conflicts with Congress’s 
presumed intent, when it chooses to fund a spending program through 
a permanent appropriation, to engender reliance on that program. 
Courts should therefore disfavor deference for permanent 
appropriations.  
 
 159. Recent judicial decisions in which courts have found it appropriate to treat 
appropriations as exceptional for interpretation purposes have pointed to appropriations’ 
separation of powers implications as the reason. See California v. Trump, 267 F. Supp. 3d 1119, 
1132 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (“[T]he role of the Appropriations Clause in enforcing the constitutional 
separation of powers provides reason for caution . . . .”); U.S. House of Representatives v. 
Burwell, 185 F. Supp. 3d 165, 169–70 (D.D.C. 2016) (“[A]ppropriations are an integral part of our 
constitutional checks and balances, insofar as they tie the Executive Branch to the Legislative 
Branch via purse strings.”). 
 160. See generally Matthew B. Lawrence, The Real Imbalance in the Balance of Powers (Jan. 
14, 2021) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (describing and 
defending the principle that structural features intended to generate power for political branches 
should not themselves take a side on whether resources are allocated through market or social 
ordering); cf. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (overturning Lochner v. United 
States, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and rejecting constitutional challenge to state minimum wage law 
premised on contract freedom). 
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a. Delegation Function.  Applying Chevron to permanent 
appropriations provisions converts any ambiguity in such a provision 
into executive discretion regarding the availability of funding. It thus 
tends to diminish each chamber’s power in the annual appropriations 
process. When Congress intentionally reduces its purse power by 
enacting a permanent appropriation that gives agencies discretion as 
described in Parts II.B and C, Chevron deepens the self-inflicted 
wound. If Congress does not intend to give the executive discretion 
over funding in permanent law but inadvertently creates an ambiguity 
in a permanent appropriation, Chevron makes Congress’s 
inadvertence costly for Congress and a windfall for the executive.  
This effect of Chevron on the balance of powers is direct when a 
dispute about the meaning of a permanent appropriation reaches the 
courts, but its impact may be even greater ex ante. The conclusion that 
Chevron applies may influence internal executive behavior vis-à-vis 
permanent appropriations provisions, even where the risk of actual 
judicial intervention is low. In appropriations, as elsewhere in 
administrative law, the first line of defense for the rule of law is 
internal—civil servants, especially agency lawyers, and appointees who 
take seriously their oaths to uphold the Constitution and avoid 
unlawful actions, whether or not they might be caught or punished.161 
In appropriations, this check is strengthened by the Antideficiency 
Act, which makes “willfully” spending without an appropriation a 
criminal offense.162  
Treating ambiguous permanent appropriations as having one 
meaning governed by statutory tools empowers this internal check; it 
makes the meaning of such appropriations a legal question that must 
be overseen by lawyers whose ethical duties and professional training 
discourage them from blessing unreasonable interpretations or 
unlawful actions. And it makes it harder for an agency to change its 
view of the meaning of a permanent appropriation, once adopted. 
Treating ambiguous permanent appropriations as policy questions 
delegated to agencies to decide (applying Chevron) does the opposite. 
 
 161. See Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 
515, 540–47 (2015) (discussing the incentives driving civil servants to follow the law for its own 
sake). But cf. Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most 
Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2334–35 (2006) (“[Do] civil servants today 
view themselves as ‘servants of the country and not of a party’? Or that their ‘success does not lie 
wholly in their ability to retain the favor of political leaders’? . . .  [F]ew agencies could say 
[so] . . . .”).  
 162. 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 1341, 1350 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-163). 
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Chevron tends to empower agency officials who lack legal training, 
leaving them no reason to include lawyers in decisionmaking processes 
where an ambiguity is present.  
b. Entrenchment Function.  Applying Chevron to permanent 
appropriations also means that their meaning can change from 
administration to administration, or even year to year. This anti-
entrenchment effect also undermines congressional power in the 
annual appropriations process by impeding congressional budgeting, 
as well as Congress’s presumed intent.  
Congress works hard to measure and predict federal expenditures 
under “current law”—the laws currently on the books—both in order 
to understand the nation’s direction and as a point of comparison to 
assess the effects of proposed legislation. Creating and tracking this 
“current law baseline”—and then measuring proposed legislation’s 
effects against it—is a primary purpose of the Congressional Budget 
Office and the budget committees.163 In turn, setting tax and spending 
levels to reflect congressional priorities for the future progress of the 
country, while establishing a framework for legislation to fit within 
those priorities, is another primary task of the budget committees.164 
Allowing the meaning of permanent appropriations to change, 
whether through judicial or executive interpretation, makes both jobs 
harder by making the government’s future expenditures under 
“current law” depend on choices that will be made in the future.  
King was nearly an example of this challenge. In that case, the 
Supreme Court applied the “major questions” doctrine exception165 to 
refuse to defer to the executive branch’s interpretation of an 
ambiguous tax credit provision in the ACA, which was incorporated by 
 
 163. See David Kamin, Basing Budget Baselines, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 143, 175–77 (2015) 
(discussing the current law baseline as “show[ing] what would happen if no further legislation 
were enacted”); Howell E. Jackson, Counting the Ways: The Structure of Federal Spending 10 
(Mar. 2007) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=985201 [https://perma.cc/JZ77-CQNC] (describing the budget process as built around the 
“baseline,” which uses “future projections” that “convey the consequences of current fiscal 
commitments as extrapolated into the future” and “set a benchmark against which policy changes 
can be scored”).  
 164. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 
Stat. 297. 
 165. See generally Michael Coenen & Seth Davis, Minor Courts, Major Questions, 70 VAND. 
L. REV. 777 (2017) (describing the major questions exception formulated in King v. Burwell and 
its proliferation in the lower courts). 
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reference in the permanent indefinite tax credit appropriation.166 But 
had the court deferred, it would have created a significant source of 
unpredictability in future federal expenditures, as it would have 
empowered the executive branch essentially to turn “on” or “off” the 
ACA’s most expensive subsidy—the premium tax credits that cost 
roughly $53 billion annually. 
Whatever logic underlies the Chevron assumption that Congress 
intended to empower agencies through ambiguities, it is another, 
unjustified leap to assume that Congress intended to disempower itself 
while frustrating its own budgeting processes. Yet deferring to agency 
interpretations of ambiguities in permanent appropriations provisions 
does just that.  
Moreover, Chevron’s anti-entrenchment function makes it harder 
for Congress to create federal spending commitments in permanent 
law on which people can rely. One strong reason for Congress to create 
permanent appropriations, despite its separation of powers costs, is to 
engender reliance on the part of funding recipients. “New property” 
entitlements are emblematic of this. To the extent a permanent 
appropriation is ambiguous, such reliance is still possible if there is a 
mechanism to entrench a given interpretation, like stare decisis. But if 
Chevron applies then ambiguity destroys reliance, because while an 
agency head can adopt whatever interpretation she thinks best, she 
cannot commit her successor to follow that interpretation.  
King provides another example. Had the Supreme Court deferred 
to the Obama administration’s interpretation of the ambiguous tax 
credit provision, it would have created a shaky state of affairs for 
residents considering relying on the ACA’s insurance marketplaces or 
insurers considering entering them. Yes, it is doubtful that the Obama 
administration would have changed its interpretation to make the 
credits unavailable, but it seems altogether possible that the Trump 
administration would have done so. And the mere fear of that result 
would make reliance difficult, defeating the purpose of encoding the 
tax credit in permanent law.  
Congress has a choice when creating a spending program. It can 
fund the program annually, maintaining tight control over the program 
through the annual appropriations process but leaving the program 
susceptible to abandonment, restriction, or sabotage as the political 
winds shift. Or it can fund the program permanently, insulating it from 
 
 166. For more on King v. Burwell, see infra Part III.D (discussing the “major questions” 
exception as a doctrinal path forward). 
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the political process and engendering reliance. When Congress chooses 
to fund a program permanently, it is reasonable to assume that 
Congress intends to create a stable program. Chevron for ambiguous 
permanent appropriations frustrates this presumed intent, by leaving 
the program’s funding, to the extent of the ambiguity, up to the 
changing views of the executive branch. Refusing Chevron for 
ambiguous permanent appropriations, on the other hand, fulfills this 
presumed intent, because through stare decisis courts applying de novo 
review entrench the meaning of ambiguous provisions.  
c. Sticky Deference Where Courts Do Defer.  The fact that courts 
should disfavor deference for permanent appropriations provisions 
does not necessarily mean that courts should adopt a categorical bar 
against such deference. It is possible that in particular cases Congress 
will clearly signal its intent that it expects resolution of ambiguities in 
a permanent appropriation to be resolved by the agency.  
In such cases, if courts do grant deference to agency 
interpretations of ambiguous permanent appropriations, they should 
seek to mitigate the problematic consequences of Chevron’s anti-
entrenchment function for reliance interests in the programs whose 
funding is at stake in the ambiguity.167 Courts could do so by adopting 
a version of Professor Kurt Eggert’s proposal for “sticky deference” in 
Chevron cases involving reliance interests, deferring to an agency’s 
interpretation of a statutory ambiguity but not permitting the agency 
to change an interpretation once announced.168  
Courts could, under current law, employ a version of “sticky 
deference” through Chevron Step Two. Recall that Step Two includes 
a substantive component in which a court will not defer to an agency’s 
interpretation if it is arbitrary and capricious.169 In the Supreme Court’s 
recent Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) decision, it 
held that the agency’s decision to rescind DACA—to change its mind 
about the program—was arbitrary and capricious because the agency 
did not sufficiently consider the reliance interests participants had 
formed around its prior interpretation.170 
 
 167. See supra Part III.C.3. 
 168. Kurt Eggert, Deference and Fiction: Reforming Chevron’s Legal Fictions After King v. 
Burwell, 95 NEB. L. REV. 702, 750–51 (2017). 
 169. See supra Part III.A (describing Chevron deference). 
 170. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1913 (2020) 
(“When an agency changes course, . . . it must ‘be cognizant that longstanding policies may have 
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Following this approach, courts might hold at Chevron Step Two 
that an agency’s changed interpretation of an ambiguous appropriation 
is arbitrary and capricious unless the agency meaningfully justifies that 
interpretive change, despite any reliance interests generated around its 
prior interpretation of that ambiguity. In this way, courts could apply a 
form of “sticky deference,” partially decouple Chevron’s delegation 
and anti-entrenchment functions, and mitigate one of the ways 
Chevron for permanent appropriations interferes with congressional 
power and practice. 
d. Employing a Rule of Narrow Interpretation is Overkill.  One 
additional note about a path not endorsed here. Some courts have 
avoided considering questions of deference by applying a clear 
statement rule against the availability of appropriations.171 This 
approach is problematic. Yes, insisting that appropriations be 
interpreted narrowly would avoid the separation of powers concerns 
posed by deference to such appropriations. But it would throw the 
baby out with the bathwater, creating substantive problems,172 
 
‘engendered serious reliance interests that must be taken into account.’” (quoting Encino 
Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2126 (2016))). 
 171. See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 185 F. Supp. 
3d 165 (D.D.C. 2016), and California v. Trump, 267 F. Supp. 3d 1119, 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2017)). 
 172. Such a rule would, in a stroke of the judicial pen, shrink permanent appropriations of all 
stripes in current law, upsetting hard-won legislative victories in which ambiguity might have 
reflected compromise. Simultaneously, if applied in the annual appropriations context, it would 
expand the reach of controversial funding restrictions like the Hyde Amendment and the Dickey-
Wicker Amendment to their maximum—for these restrictions also limit the availability of 
appropriations. 
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undermining accountability,173 and breaking with history.174 The 
presumption against deference for permanent appropriations endorsed 
here mitigates disruptions to the separation of powers without these 
collateral consequences.  
3. For Deference for Annual Appropriations.  Whether courts 
defer to agency interpretations of annual appropriations provisions 
does not matter very much for congressional power and practice. 
Chevron operates at the margins of annual appropriations, or in their 
ambiguities, and Congress can and does enforce those margins on its 
own, usually without courts.175  
Moreover, opportunities for judicial intervention in annual 
appropriations are necessarily rare because lawsuits usually take 
longer to resolve through district court litigation—notwithstanding any 
possible appeals—than annual appropriations last. This mismatch 
between the speed of annual appropriations and the speed of litigation 
is exacerbated by two further impediments to judicial intervention. 
First, the possibility that the Appropriations Clause precludes courts 
from ordering emergency relief requiring expenditure when an agency 
believes an appropriation is insufficient makes quick relief unlikely for 
failure-to-pay claims.176 Second, the fact that taxpayers lack standing to 
 
 173. A clear statement rule against funding would undermine political accountability by 
making spending legislation harder to enact in the future. Ambiguity in legislation is often an 
intentional compromise; sides unable to agree on an outcome might be able to agree to roll the 
dice on that outcome by leaving it to the interpretive process. Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C. 
Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory 
Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627, 628 (2002) (“Ambiguity serves a legislative 
purpose. When legislators perceive a need to compromise they can, among other strategies, 
‘obscur[e] the particular meaning of a statute, allowing different legislators to read the obscured 
provisions the way they wish.’” (alteration in original) (quoting ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, 
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 779–80 (1995))); see also Courtney Simmons, Unmasking the Rhetoric of 
Purpose: The Supreme Court and Legislative Compromise, 44 EMORY L.J. 117, 118 (1995) 
(“[B]oth factions [may] accept the vague terminology because the language can be interpreted to 
include their positions . . . .”). A clear statement rule would preclude this form of compromise in 
legislation permitting federal spending, tending to make such legislation harder to pass. 
 174. See Lawrence, Disappropriation, supra note 8, at 75–77 (describing agency practice that 
does not acknowledge a clear statement rule); supra notes 104–05 and accompanying text 
(explaining that a district court’s adoption of such a clear statement rule was based on a 
misunderstanding of a relevant statutory provision). 
 175. See supra Part II.A.  
 176. See Lawrence, Disappropriation, supra note 8, at 84–85 (raising this possibility). The 
above discussion refers to the “margins” of appropriations—it does not speak to the question of 
courts’ role in enforcing outright defiance of the Appropriations Clause, which raises important 
questions not considered here. See U.S. House of Representatives v. Mnuchin, 976 F.3d 1, 10 
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challenge unlawful expenditures means that unlawful expenditure 
claims are often nonjusticiable.177  
Additionally, if courts incorrectly interpret annual appropriations, 
Congress has ready and automatic opportunities to clarify its intent 
through the annual appropriations process.178 Indeed, if courts defer to 
agency interpretations of annual appropriations and Congress does not 
like it, it can even prohibit deference to one or all agencies’ annual 
appropriations without upsetting the doctrine in other contexts.179  
That said, to the extent it does matter, shifting authority to 
interpret ambiguities from courts to agencies (Chevron’s delegation 
function) generally respects Congress’s primary role in overseeing 
agencies’ implementations of annual appropriations laws. Deference 
means no third party can undo the results of the political branches’ 
resolutions of disputes about the meanings of appropriations laws. De 
novo review, on the other hand, creates a risk of surprise and 
disruption, adding unpredictability to the annual appropriations 
process.180 
Chevron’s anti-entrenchment function also respects the nature of 
the annual appropriations process. As Professor Neil Devins points 
out, there is an incongruity between stare decisis and the fact that 
annual appropriations are altered or reenacted each year.181 Even 
riders like the Hyde Amendment that are perennially reenacted may 
have their wording changed in the process—and even if their wording 
does not change, the legislative context and intent behind their 
enactment likely will.182 Chevron avoids this incongruence by allowing 
 
(D.C. Cir. 2020) (discussing separation of powers implications if there were no external 
mechanism to enforce Appropriations Clause against a resistant executive branch).  
 177. Sohoni, supra note 19, at 1706–07 (explaining barriers to standing in litigation challenging 
an unconstitutional expenditure).  
 178. See Garrett, supra note 157, at 2668–69.  
 179. See id. at 2656 (suggesting that Congress could plainly express a preference “that courts 
serve as the primary interpreters of vague and ambiguous language”). 
 180. For a discussion of the consequences of unpredictability, see generally Lucy White, 
Prudence in Bargaining: The Effect of Uncertainty on Bargaining Outcomes, 62 GAMES & ECON. 
BEHAV. 211 (2008) (showing how uncertainty produces bargaining failure), and Oren Bar-Gill, 
The Evolution and Persistence of Optimism in Litigation, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 490 (2006) (noting 
that “uncertainty and asymmetric information . . . have been invoked to explain bargaining 
impasse” and collecting pertinent sources).  
 181. Devins, supra note 30, at 498–99.  
 182. Id. at 466–68. 
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variations in the interpretation of ambiguous riders when they are 
reenacted in multiple years. 
Courts should be open, then, to Chevron for annual 
appropriations. That leaves the question of how courts should decide 
whether to defer in particular cases. The following distinctive 
considerations about these unique statutory provisions should inform 
this inquiry:  
Insisting on notice and comment for annual appropriations may 
undermine rather than enhance accountability. The accountability value 
ordinarily supports courts favoring (or insisting upon) notice-and-
comment rulemaking in deciding whether to defer to agency action.183 
Doing so encourages agencies to make their decisions in a way that 
features active public participation and explanations. Readers alarmed 
to learn about the lack of procedure that so often surrounds 
appropriations decisionmaking184 may see this as a context ripe for 
judicial encouragement of notice-and-comment rulemaking. Favoring, 
or insisting upon, this procedure as a prerequisite to deference for 
interpretations of annual appropriations provisions would certainly 
encourage proceduralization of appropriations decisions.  
I hesitate to endorse such a pro-procedure approach, however, 
without more information. The reason for my hesitation is the fact that, 
unlike other areas of administrative law, agency decisions about annual 
appropriations are checked first and foremost by Congress. Here is a 
domain within the administrative state in which Congress remains 
active and involved, itself a central, though sometimes controversial, 
form of “political accountability” contemplated by the Framers.185 
Might judicial encouragement of notice-and-comment rulemaking for 
appropriations decisions have unintended consequences for this 
arguably salutary arrangement? Could notice-and-comment 
rulemaking processes themselves crowd out informal congressional 
influence, effectively trading one form of participation (congressional 
influence) for another (notice-and-comment rulemaking)?186 
 
 183. This consideration is part of Hickman and Nielson’s well-considered and interesting call 
to simplify Chevron by insisting, for the most part, on notice-and-comment rulemaking. Hickman 
& Nielson, supra note 88, at 965–68.  
 184. See supra Part I.C. 
 185. See supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text (describing the debate about the legitimacy 
of congressional influence through the appropriations process). 
 186. Cf. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 408–10 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (discussing limitations on 
undisclosed congressional involvement in notice-and-comment rulemaking). 
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Resolution of these currently unstudied questions is necessary to 
decide whether courts should explicitly preference notice-and-
comment rulemaking when it comes to annual appropriations on the 
ground that doing so would promote accountability.187  
Annual appropriations are naturally transitory. The transitory 
nature of annual appropriations usually precludes lengthy or 
procedurally involved agency consideration. The absence of these 
factors is therefore poor evidence that Congress intended courts rather 
than agencies to make judgments about the meaning of ambiguous 
annual appropriations provisions. 
Appropriations directed to a single secretary or agency. When it 
comes to annual appropriations, courts must look beyond the 
legislative vehicle to the actual provision being interpreted to 
determine whether it is administered by a single agency. Although they 
may include different sections applicable to different agencies, 
appropriations bills are written largely by subcommittees focused on 
particular agencies, and appropriations provisions usually apply to a 
specific agency or agency head.  
D. Doctrinal Basis for Tailoring 
Although courts have not yet adopted the bifurcated approach 
advocated here, there is doctrinal support for such a move. The 
Supreme Court has noted that, in general, in deciding whether to defer 
in particular cases “[t]he Court’s choice has been to tailor deference to 
variety.”188 I argue here not for “exceptionalism” in appropriations,189 
but rather for informed application of the Chevron framework to the 
distinctive features of appropriations provisions, especially the 
contradictory role of annual and permanent appropriations provisions 
in the separation of powers.  
Moreover, appropriations have long been understood to be an 
area of the law with distinctive features to which existing legal 
 
 187. This hesitation does not apply to permanent appropriations; falling outside Congress’s 
domain, they do not present the same risk that notice-and-comment procedures could crowd out 
congressional influence. 
 188. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 236 (2001). 
 189. See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Rsch. v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 55–56 (2011) 
(refusing to create a special deference rule for tax law); City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 
297, 301 (2013) (refusing to create a special deference rule for “jurisdictional” provisions). 
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frameworks must be tailored.190 This is exemplified in administrative 
law by the rule stating that decisions on how to spend lump-sum 
appropriations are committed to agency discretion by law.191 And it is 
exemplified in statutory interpretation by the rule that implied repeals 
in annual appropriations are particularly disfavored.192  
Indeed, if one were needed, the Appropriations Clause itself 
offers a textual basis for a categorical limitation on Chevron in 
appropriations law. The clause says that appropriations must be made 
“by Law,”193 but Chevron deference for appropriations provisions 
would give agencies the power to turn appropriations “on” or “off,” 
arguably running afoul of that requirement.194 A nondelegation canon 
 
 190. Professor Metzger has recently lamented that courts have often treated appropriations 
differently to marginalize them. See Metzger, supra note 13 (manuscript at Part III).  
 191. Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 192 (1993). 
 192. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 189–90 (1978). 
 193. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. 
 194. The Appropriations Clause insists that Congress approve of all expenditures from the 
treasury. Id. The question has not previously been explored, and a historical analysis of Congress’s 
delegation of the appropriations power is beyond this Article’s scope. However, it may be 
supportable to hold that Congress cannot delegate the appropriations power as it can its other 
powers, including its spending power. On this view, Congress could appropriate “such sums as the 
Secretary of the Treasury deems essential to respond to a viral pandemic” without running afoul 
of the nondelegation doctrine or the Appropriations Clause. In this hypothetical, Congress would 
have appropriated the funds and set their amount and available purposes—here, anything 
deemed essential by the secretary of the treasury. But, as the argument would go, Congress could 
not delegate the power to appropriate to the secretary, such as providing that “the Secretary of 
the Treasury shall make such appropriations from the Treasury as she deems essential to respond 
to a viral pandemic.” Such a delegation would run afoul of the constitutional requirement that 
appropriations be “made by Law.” Id.  
The difference between delegating power to influence the purposes to which an 
appropriation might be devoted or the amount expended through the appropriation, on the one 
hand, and delegating power to appropriate funds, on the other, may seem largely formalistic. 
However, it respects, even if in some cases only formally, Congress’s ultimate responsibility and 
accountability for the use of taxpayer funds, which is an expressive benefit. Indeed, the distinction 
between legal spending—which is legal because it is authorized—and constitutional spending—
which is constitutional because it is appropriated—mattered enough to the Framers that they 
addressed the subjects separately, giving Congress authority over spending in one clause of the 
Constitution and prohibiting expenditures absent appropriations in another. Compare id. § 8, cl. 
1 (granting Congress power to “pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general 
Welfare of the United States”), with id. § 9, cl. 7 (“No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, 
but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law . . . .”). It also creates avenues to impose 
heightened internal restrictions on agencies for undermining Congress’s domain—willful 
expenditure without an appropriation is a felony under the Antideficiency Act, for example, but 
willfully awarding a grant to a recipient who does not meet statutory conditions of eligibility is 
not. Use of Appropriated Funds To Provide Light Refreshments to Non-Fed. Participants at EPA 
Confs., 31 Op. O.L.C. 54, 62–71 (2007) (explaining that the Antideficiency Act does not apply to 
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that limits deference in appropriations law could thus arguably be 
drawn from the Appropriations Clause.195  
Doctrinally, the bifurcated approach recommended here is 
consistent with courts’ past treatment of Chevron for appropriations, 
because cases expressly considering deference have done so with 
regard to annual appropriations, not permanent ones.196 This makes 
sense even if courts draw a nondelegation canon from the 
Appropriations Clause. A court might hold that the existence of the 
annual appropriations process is an effective check on executive 
discretion, and thus mitigates nondelegation concerns in that context. 
Therefore, this process limits the application of any nondelegation 
canon forbidding Chevron for appropriations to permanent 
appropriations provisions.197  
Courts might also look to King v. Burwell as a doctrinal basis for 
an anti-deference rule in appropriations, though such a doctrinal move 
creates some challenges. King held that the question of whether the 
ACA provided for billions in federal subsidies necessary to make the 
law work was a “major question” excepted from Chevron.198 The Court 
held that the credits were one of the ACA’s “key reforms, involving 
billions of dollars in spending each year and affecting the price of 
health insurance for millions of people.”199 The credits’ availability thus 
posed “a question of deep ‘economic and political significance’ that is 
central to th[e] statutory scheme.”200 And because the IRS lacked 
 
spending in violation of legal provision not included in statute creating appropriation). If one 
accepts the argument that Congress cannot delegate the appropriations power, it is a logical next 
step to say courts should presume Congress delegated authority to turn an appropriation “on” 
and “off,” as Chevron for appropriations would entail.  
 195. Cf. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 n.10 (1986) (noting that in light of the conclusion 
that the comptroller general was not a permissible target for delegation, “we have no occasion for 
considering appellees’ . . . argument that the assignment of powers to the Comptroller General in  
§ 251 violates the delegation doctrine”); Eugene Kontorovich, Discretion, Delegation, and 
Defining in the Constitution’s Law of Nations Clause, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1675, 1741–43 (2012) 
(arguing in favor of an antidelegation presumption drawn from the Offenses Clause). On 
nondelegation canons generally, see Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 
315, 330–37 (2000) (describing such canons). 
 196. See supra Part III.B. 
 197. For an argument that courts should consider the possibility of congressional oversight 
through the annual appropriations process in reviewing nondelegation challenges, see Metzger, 
supra note 13, (manuscript at 64). 
 198. King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 485–86 (2015).  
 199. Id. at 485 (quoting Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014)). 
 200. Id. at 486. 
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expertise in health care, the tax credits represented one of those 
“extraordinary cases” where the court finds “reason to hesitate before 
concluding” that ambiguity in a statute represents an implicit 
delegation.201 Could this case represent a path forward for 
appropriations? 
Sohoni focuses on King’s reference to federal spending and 
suggests that the case can be understood to reflect not an expansion of 
the “major questions” doctrine but a straightforward rule that “agency 
interpretations of ambiguous statutory authority that cause large 
amounts of federal spending” should not receive deference.202 That 
view is difficult to square with the King opinion. It carves out King’s 
reference to the political and personal stakes of the statutory 
interpretation question at issue to focus exclusively on the court’s 
reference to financial stakes, and leaves significant ambiguity about 
how much money is enough to trigger the rule.203 Moreover, by denying 
deference not only to appropriations but also to spending provisions 
generally, this approach is broader than the approaches identified 
previously in a way that contradicts a longstanding body of case law 
deferring to agency interpretations of spending provisions.204 
Sohoni’s view would, however, provide a doctrinal means to limit 
agency discretion to interpret some permanent appropriations should 
any court wish to pursue it. If so, I offer two friendly amendments to 
Sohoni’s proposed understanding of King as a potential doctrinal path 
forward, based on the foregoing. First, rather than the undefined 
modifier of “large scale” as the boundary line between spending 
ambiguities that receive deference and those that do not, courts should 
make the dividing line spending authorities that are funded through 
permanent appropriations provisions (reviewed de novo) versus 
spending authorities that are subject to annual appropriations 
 
 201. Id. at 485 (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 
(2000)). 
 202. Sohoni, supra note 126, at 1432. 
 203. King might be better read as precluding deference as to ambiguities that entail 
particularly significant reliance interests, such as the “deep ‘economic and political significance’” 
of the premium tax credits. King, 576 U.S. at 486. As described in the opinion, they played a 
foundational role in developing the new ACA marketplaces. The law depended on these 
marketplaces in order to attract the investment of both customers and insurers, both of which 
were crucial to the credits’ practical and political success. 
 204. See, e.g., Adirondack Med. Ctr. v. Sebelius, 740 F.3d 692, 700–01 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 
(deferring to an agency interpretation of a spending provision in a Medicare statute); see also 
supra Part I (describing difference between authorizing statutes and appropriations). 
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(reviewed applying Chevron). Second, rather than refuse agency 
deference only when an agency reads an appropriation to “cause” 
federal spending,205 courts pursuing this approach should refuse 
deference to any agency interpretation of an ambiguous permanent 
appropriation, whether the agency chooses to spend money or refuses 
to spend money. A one-way exception to deference that permits it 
when an agency does not spend but grants it when the agency does 
spend would have a significant substantive valence against spending. 
But it would still permit the executive to leverage the threat of funding 
cutoffs to aggrandize its own power and undermine congressional 
power.206  
CONCLUSION: APPROPRIATION DURATION, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 
AND CONGRESS’S DOMAIN 
This Article has described Congress’s domain—the world of 
legislatively enforced administrative law and congressional influence 
made possible by each chamber’s unicameral power to refuse funding 
for any agency or program that relies on annual appropriations. It has 
also explained how permanent appropriations provisions shrink 
Congress’s domain. This dynamic has implications for the 
incorporation of appropriations into administrative law doctrine. 
When it comes to Chevron for appropriations, it means that deference 
for annual appropriations respects congressional authority but that 
deference for permanent appropriations undermines it. Thus, this 
Article recommends a bifurcated approach to Chevron for 
appropriations.  
The dichotomy between annual and permanent appropriations 
has implications beyond the narrow but important question of the 
applicability of Chevron to appropriations. One such implication is the 
possibility that discretionary permanent appropriations may implicate 
heightened nondelegation doctrine concerns drawn in part from the 
Appropriations Clause. Another possibility that future scholarship 
might productively consider is whether Lincoln v. Vigil’s207 holding that 
agency decisions about how to spend lump-sum appropriations are not 
reviewable in court under the APA should be limited to the annual 
 
 205. Sohoni, supra note 126, at 1432. 
 206. See supra note 173 and accompanying text (describing the normative assumption that an 
interpretive rule should strive to avoid favoring or disfavoring particular substantive outcomes). 
 207. Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182 (1993). 
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appropriations context, given the relevance of congressional oversight 
in that context to the reasoning in that case and the separation of 
powers implications of long-term appropriations.208 Similarly, 
Congress’s enforcement tools in the annual appropriations space may 
impact the need for legislative standing to enforce the Appropriations 
Clause in this context.  
Finally, moving beyond doctrinal questions, future scholarship 
could helpfully explore and problematize the extent to which the rules 
for agency behavior created and enforced by Congress through the 
annual appropriations process are consistent with, undermine, or 
otherwise interact with the rules for agency behavior created by the 
APA and enforced by the courts—and vice versa.209 As scholars, 
judges, and policymakers work to understand, negotiate, and shape the 
many legal and extralegal influences on the administrative state, they 
should remain mindful that changes that affect agencies’ dependence 
on annual appropriations redraw the boundaries of Congress’s domain. 
 
 
 208. See supra Part II.C. 
 209. Scholarship might also consider how Congress’s control of agencies through the 
appropriations process interacts not just with statutory administration law but also with internal 
administrative law. See generally Metzger & Stack, supra note 61 (describing executive branch 
rules governing the behavior of agencies). 
